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RECONCILING COMPETITION AND COOPERATION: A NEW
ANTITRUST STANDARD FOR JOINT VENTURES
THOMAS A. PIRAINO, JR.*
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for mer-
rment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a con-
spiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices.'
Ford's Red Poling and Bob Stempel of GM and I walk into
rooms arm-m-arm, hugging each other now We're in consor-
tia; We have continual discussions on health care costs, on
regulation, on trade matters, the three groups we set up a
year and a half ago.2
I. THE NEED FOR A NEW ANTITRUST. STANDARD
These observations of Adam Smith and Lee Iacocca highlight
a central unresolved dilemma of American antitrust law Will
this country's economic growth be enhanced more by encourag-
ing rivals to cooperate or to compete? After more than a century
of case law, the courts still cannot agree on how to reconcile the
economic advantages of competition and cooperation.'
Traditionally, the courts have interpreted the Sherman Act4
as a mandate to protect the free market from agreements among
competitors "in restraint of trade."5 Most courts have assumed
* Vice President-Law, Parker-Hannifin Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio. B.A., Alle-
gheny College, 1971; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1974. The opinions expressed in this
Article are the author's personal opinions and do not reflect the opinions of Parker-
Hannifin Corporation.
1. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 144 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Cli. Press 1976).
2. Iacocca: Lee's Parting Shots, FORTUNE, Sept. 7, 1992, at 56, 57 (quoting Lee
Iacocca, Chief Executive Officer, Chrysler Corporation).
3. Jonathan B. Baker, Per Se Rules in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Re-
straints, 36 ANTITRUST BULL, 733, 735 (f'991); see also Lawrence A. Sullivan, The
Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 835, 841
(1987) (arguing that the courts have not yet resolved the problem of a restraint that
confers both market power and efficiencies).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). The Sherman Act prohibits "[elvery contract, combina-
tion or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." Id. § 1.
5. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
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that, under the antitrust laws, competition and cooperation are
irreconcilable. When firms cooperate to achieve a common objec-
tive, competition among them, by definition, must be precluded.
The courts thus have regarded competition as a value to be
protected and cooperation (usually described pejoratively as "col-
lusion") as an evil to be prevented.' Under this view, coopera-
tive arrangements among competitors have been treated
harshly 7 Indeed, in the view of some antitrust commentators,
collaboration among competitors is not unlike "the very trusts
that the antitrust laws were enacted to prevent."8
During the last decade many American companies have con-
cluded that they can succeed more effectively by cooperating
(1978) (noting the illegality of a ban on competitive bidding by a group of rival engi-
neers); United States v. Topco Assocs. 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (holding territorial re-
strictions among a group of competing supermarkets illegal); Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (noting the illegality of territorial and
price-fixing restrictions among the partners to a European joint venture).
6. See Paul T. Denis, Market Power in Antitrust Merger Analysis: Refining the
Collusion Hypothesis, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 829, 832 (1992); see also Thomas M. Jorde
& David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 12
(1989) ("[In both the textbooks and in policy discussion among economists,
cooperation among competitors is still primarily viewed as nefarious."). The Supreme
Court set forth the traditional view against cooperation among competitors in
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984):
Concerted activity deprives the marketplace of the independent cen-
ters of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In any
conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own inter-
ests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit.
Id. at 768-69. In the merger area, the 'collusion hypothesis" evolved as the tradition-
al basis for analyzing business combinations. This approach assumes that firms have
an anticompetitive purpose for mergers, that is, to facilitate collusion among the
remaining firms in the market. See Denis, supra, at 829; Charles F Rule & David
L. Meyer, Toward a Merger Policy That Maximizes Consumer Welfare: Enforcement
by Careful Analysis, Not by the Numbers, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 251, 275 (1990). The
Merger Guidelines issued by the United States Department of Justice and the Feder-
al Trade Commission have adopted the collusion hypothesis. See Merger Guide-
lines-1992, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T1 13,104, § 2.1, at 20,573-6 (Apr. 7, 1992)
[hereinafter DOJ Merger Guidelines] ("A merger may diminish competition by en-
abling firms selling in the relevant market more likely, more successfully, or more
completely to engage in coordinated interaction [Coordinated interaction] in-
cludes tacit or express collusion ").
7. The view has been that "no cooperation should be permitted, that it is best
that we keep companies apart from one another." Jorde & Teece, supra note 6, at
18 & n.43 (quoting WILLIAM G. OUCHI, THEORY Z (1984)).
8. Baker, supra note 3, at 733.
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rather than competing with their rivals. "Going it alone" is no
longer an option for many American businesses.' Intensified
foreign competition, increased demands for new technologies,
soaring capital and research and development costs, shortened
product life cycles, and more stringent demands for quality and
performance have all added to the risk of doing business.10
Many firms simply lack the capital, labor, or technology required
to compete effectively in such an environment." Their only al-
ternative is to access such resources through cooperative efforts
with their competitors. 2
From basic industries such as automobiles and steel to high
technology computer, electromc, and medical fields, American
firms are forming strategic alliances with their competitors at
an unprecedented rate. Indeed, the number of new strategic
alliances in the United States has nearly doubled in each of the
last ten years." In just a sixty-day period in mid-1993, the "Big
Three" American automobile compames announced that they
had won a joint patent for a manufacturing process which will
replace steel with light weight material in automobiles; 4 Time-
9. Jorde & Teece, supra note 6, at 33-34.
10. See id. at 5, 36; see also Stephen E. Almassy & E.B. Baatz, 455 Electronics
Execs Say Rugged Individualism Is Fading, reprinted in ERNST & YOUNG, PROGRES-
SION OF AN INDUSTRY: ELECTRONICS 92: STRATEGIC ALLIANCE OUTLOOK (1992) (citing
these elements as a primary reason for the growth of alliances between electronics
companies).
11. Jorde & Teece, supra note 6, at 33-34; William J. Murphy, Interfirm Coopera-
tion in a Competitive Economic System, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 31, 31-32 (1988).
12. Jorde & Teece, supra note 6, at 34. The Cummins Engine Company and
Komatsu Limited of Japan, for example, recently 'Joined the list of huge multina-
tionals pooling their resources to manufacture existing products and develop new
ones." Barnaby J. Feder, Two Diesel Giants Set Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993,
at D1. The joint venture, which will manufacture diesel engines in Japan, "comes at
a time when the pace of industrial cooperation is accelerating both domestically and
across borders." Id. at D5. In commenting on the joint venture, Robert Aliber, Pro-
fessor of International Economics and Finance at the University of Chicago's Gradu-
ate School of Business, stated, "I don't see any end to it." Id.
13. Jeremy Main, Making Global Alliances Work, FORTUNE, Dec. 17, 1990, at 121,
126 ("Strategic alliances have become fundamental to doing business in the 1990's.").
One author has described strategic alliances as "the competitive weapon of the
1990's." Jordan D. Lewis, Competitive Alliances Redefine Companies, MGMT. REV.,
Apr. 1991, at 14, 14.
14. Oscar Survis, Big Three Win Joint Patent, Marking a First, WALL ST. J., Apr.
13, 1993, at B1. The Big Three are now engaged in no less than 10 research and
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Warner and U.S. West formed a joint venture to build an enter-
tainment and communications network;"5 AT&T entered into
an alliance with several international telecommunumcations com-
panies to provide a worldwide telephone system;i" and British
Telecommunications and MCI countered by forming their own
global joint venture. 17
This trend toward strategic alliances "may even amount to a
new chapter in the development of capitalism."" During most
of the twentieth century corporations have attempted to grow
through acquisitions and internal expansion; in the current
environment, however, American firms are finding it more prof-
itable to enter new markets through strategic alliances with
their competitors. 9 By sharing critical assets and other re-
sources, firms can reduce the costs and risks of developing new
products or production processes. The joint research and devel-
opment projects, purchasing alliances, and production joint ven-
tures now being formed in several American industries amount
to a uniquely American version of Ketretsu-groups of allied
corporations that traditionally have dominated Japanese indus-
try 20
This emphasis on new cooperative forms of business orgamza-
tion is not limited to industrial corporations. The health care
industry is on the threshold of a revolutionary change in orgam-
zation. With a national health care bill in excess of $800 billion
a year, more than thirteen percent of the Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, and with thirty-five to thirty-seven million Americans lack-
ing health care coverage, a consensus is beginning to emerge on
development consortia. Id.
15. Mary Lu Carnevale et al., U.S. West Move Puts Pressure on Its Rivals, WALL
ST. J., May 18, 1993, at Bi.
16. AT&T Plans to Establish Global Information System, WALL ST. J., May 26,
1993, at B6.
17. John J. Keller & Mary Lu Carnevale, MCI and BT Set a Counterstrike
Against AT&T, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1993, at A3.
18. Stephen K. Yoder & G. Pascal Zachary, Digital Media Business Takes Form as
a Battle of Complex Alliances, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1993, at Al.
19. Id. As Time-Warner's Chief Executive, Gerald Levin, recently stated, "We de-
cided to build the company not by the traditional macho American strategy of ac-
quirmg someone and controlling them." Id. at A4.
20. Id.
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the need for health care reform.2 Changes in the means by
which health care providers compete are likely to be the corner-
stone of reform on both the federal and state level. Many reform-
ers blame the current competitive environment for the inefficien-
cies in America's health care system. Some point out that com-
petition "has led to a kind of medical arms race in which even
small hospitals try to offer patients all the latest technology "22
Others note that the lack of competition among providers is to
blame for the high cost of health care. Because insurance
compames cover most health care costs, consumers rarely make
the effort to shop for health care services or to bargain with
health care providers.2" As a result, health care providers do
not compete with each other on either price or quality 25
The Clinton Admimstration's proposals for health care reform
rely on a combination of competition and cooperation to reduce
health care costs. The plan provides for the formation of large
regional alliances which would buy health care insurance for
individuals and small businesses. With the bargaimng power
to extract price concessions from health care providers," these
health alliances would introduce competition into a system
which traditionally has lacked it. At the same time, the Admim-
stration's plan would encourage greater cooperation among
health care providers. In response to the demands of the health
care purchasing alliances, hospitals and physicians are likely to
21. See A Cure for Health Care, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1993, at 16 (unsigned edito-
rial).
22. Edward Felsenthal, New Rules Let Hospitals Start Joint Ventures, WALL ST.
J., May 14, 1993, at B1, B5.
23. Id. (noting that the current "tenet of faith" is that more intense competition
will. reduce health care prices).
24. See Peter Passell, Health Care's Fever: Not So High to Some, N.Y. TIMES, May
16, 1993, § 4, at 3 (noting how consumers, because of insurance companies' reim-
bursement, are ill informed about health care costs).
25. Id. ("Sellers need not compete on quality because the consumers rarely un-
derstand what they're buying. Nor do they compete on price because insurance pays
90% of the bill so consumers treat health care as if it were free."); A Cure for
Health Care, supra note 21, at 16.
26. See Robert Pear, Clinton Offering Health Plan with Guarantee of Coverage and
Curb on Private Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at Al, A9; Greg Steinmetz,
Clinton's Health Plans Are Likely to Step up the Switch to HMOs, WALL ST. J., May
18, 1993, at Al, A6.
27. Steinmetz, supra note 26, at A6.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
form health maintenance organizations and other cooperative
ventures that would provide more efficient health care services
to consumers." Such health care networks should be preferred
by the purchasing alliances, because they permit the negotiation
of a single contract providing for health care for all members of
the alliance at a guaranteed price.29
An antitrust model that posits all-out, unrestricted competi-
tion as the only acceptable mode of behavior disregards the
economic advantages of the new cooperative forms of business
organization which are now transforming American manufactur-
ing, service, and health care industries. The courts must fashion
a new antitrust approach which recognizes the economic effects
of these new organizations. Such an approach should begin with
a recognition that, in the joint venture context, competition and
cooperation are not antithetical, but complementary, concepts. 0
A joint venture may allow its partners to achieve economic effi-
ciencies that they could not have accomplished on their own. In
the long run, such efficiencies may outweigh any restriction of
competition caused by a joint venture. A joint venture among
manufacturing firms for the development of a new product, for
example, may eliminate competition among firms in the re-
search and development phase but ultimately enhance competi-
tion when they begin to market the new product. An alliance
among hospitals and physicians may reduce the health care al-
ternatives available to consumers in a particular area but also
28. Indeed, in anticipation of health care reform, hospitals, doctors and insurance
companies in several sections of the country already have begun to form health care
networks that offer a full spectrum of care for a fixed price. See Robert Pear, Health
Industry Is Moving to Form Service Networks, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 1993, at Al.
29. Id. at A8.
30. As Judge Easterbrook stated in Polk Brothers, Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises,
776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985):
Cooperation is the basis of productivity. It is necessary for people to
cooperate in some respects before they may compete in others, and coop-
eration facilitates efficient production The war of all against all is
not a good model for any economy. Antitrust law is designed to ensure
an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to require all
economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment.
Id. at 188; accord Murphy, supra note 11, at 33 ("Cooperative activity can enhance
competition as well as diminish it.").
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may permit those consumers to obtain higher quality care at a
lower price.
Any effective antitrust approach to joint ventures must recog-
nize the beneficial, as well as the anticompetitive, aspects of
such arrangements. The courts' objective should be to insure
neither pure competition nor complete cooperation but an appro-
priate blending of the two.3 In the most efficient markets, com-
petition and cooperation coexist. When called upon to determine
the legality of particular joint ventures, the courts should at-
tempt to ensure that the forces of competition and cooperation
are balanced properly 2
In recent years some courts have developed new antitrust
approaches to cooperative arrangements among competitors.
31. Such a balanced approach is consistent with the intent of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). The statutory terms "restraint of trade" and "monopoly,"
which were included in § 1 and § 2 of the Act, derive from the common law, which
had distinguished between power gained in the marketplace by legitimate means and
power acquired through coercive tactics. In ins comments during the congressional
debates, Senator Sherman himself stated that the courts would have to "distingmush
between lawful combinations in aid of production and unlawful combinations to pre-
vent competition and in restraint of trade." 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of
Sen. Sherman).
In its early cases interpreting the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court recognized
that Congress could not have intended to ban all cooperative activity but only that
conduct which unreasonably restrains competition. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 66 (1911) (applying the "rule of reason" to determine
whether a business combination constitutes an illegal restraint of trade). Firms, after
all, must cooperate in certain ways in order to carry on any business at all. It
would be absurd to construe the Sherman Act to prohibit ordinary and beneficial
economic activity. Indeed, as Justice Brandeis pointed out in a 1917 case, the Act's
prohibition against all restraints of trade could not be read literally, because [e]very
agreement concerning trade restrains" trade in some manner. Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Justice Brandeis also implied that
certain cooperative arrangements among competitors ultimately might promote com-
petition: "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition." Id. (emphasis added).
32. In debating the Sherman Act, one congressman described the need for balance:
[T]here are two great forces working in human society in this country
today, and they have been contending for the mastery on one side or the
other for the last two generations. Those two great forces are competition
and combination. They are correctives of each other, and both ought to
exist. Both ought to be under restraint. Either of them, if allowed to be
unrestrained, is destructive of the material interest of this country.
21 CONG. REC. 5956 (1890) (statement of Rep. Stewart).
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These new. approaches, however, have been largely piecemeal
and contradictory and have failed to offer a unified method of
analysis for joint ventures."3 Their divergence has confused
practitioners and business executives as to the proper antitrust
standard for the analysis of cooperative arrangements. This
confusion has deterred the formation of new joint ventures.34
Such deterrence could have serious consequences for the Amen-
can economy Historically, advances in technology and productiv-
ity have generated growth in the United States.35 Such growth
could be threatened if the antitrust laws are interpreted to pre-
vent firms from working with their competitors to develop im-
proved means of producing, marketing, and delivering products
and services.
Recent legislative attempts to clarify the antitrust standards
for joint ventures have been just as unsuccessful. The federal
laws passed during the last ten years deal with only a part of
the problem, thereby perpetuating an inconsistent approach to
33. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
34. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 6, at 36 ('Current U.S. antitrust law needlessly
inhibits strategic alliances designed to develop and commercialize new technology.");
see also Panel Discussion, Commentary: Antitrust and International Competitiveness
in the 1990's, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 591, 603-07 (1989) (statement of panel participant
U.S. Rep. Tom Campbell advocating change in antitrust laws for production joint
ventures). Some commentators have argued, however, that the antitrust laws pose
little, if any, deterrence to the formation of legitimate joint ventures. See, e.g., Joel
B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for Joint Production Ventures, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 253, 261
(1990) ("The antitrust laws are remarkably flexible in permitting joint activity
The antitrust laws are not a large barrier to consortia formation.").
35. See EDWARD F DENNISON, ACCOUNTING FOR UNITED STATES ECONOMIC
GROWTH, 1929-1969, at 131-37 (1974) (providing economic analysis of how advances
in knowledge and output have fueled post-war economic growth); Thomas M. Jorde
& David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements
Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 ANTITRUST L.J.
579, 586 (1993) (discussing the link between technological change and economic
growth); see also Louis Uchitelle, Stanching the Loss of Good Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 1993, § 3, at 1, 6 ("To generate jobs, the nation has traditionally relied on
a dramatic new product, based on new American technology, that would be manufac-
tured initially in American factories."); The Outlook: Public Investment Offers No
Magic, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1993, at Ai (stating that "productivity increases are
made possible by technological discoveries"). During the last two decades, growth m
productivity in the United States has lagged behind that of other industrial coun-
tries. See David E. Rosenbaum, Taste of Harsh Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1993,
at Al, A17.
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the analysis of joint ventures. The Export Trading Company Act
of 1982,"s which grants an antitrust exemption to certain joint
export activities, has a limited scope and does not even protect
the joint manufacture of products for export.3 7 The National
Cooperative Research Act of 198438 was passed by Congress to
encourage the formation of research and development joint ven-
tures. The protection granted by this Act, however, is very limit-
ed. Although the Act exempts certain research and development
ventures from treble damages, the parties to a venture still can
be liable for regular damages." The Act also does not extend to
joint production and marketing or even to certain applied re-
search.4" The National Cooperative Production Amendments of
1993 extend the National Cooperative Research Act to certain
production joint ventures.4' Many types of production ventures,
however, would not be covered by the new law,42 and the law
36. Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1988)
and scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4002, 4013 (1988). The Act applies to trading companies which
are organized and operated principally for purposes of selling export goods or ser-
vices. Id. § 4002.
38. Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988)).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 4303 (1988).
40. Sara G. Zwart, Innovate, Integrate, and Cooperate: Antitrust Changes and
Challenges in the United States and the European Economic Community, 1989 UTAH
L. REV. 63, 89. The Acefs distinction between "pure" research and its applications is
artificial. In order to commercialize a product effectively, development engineers
must receive feedback from the production and marketing stages. See Jorde & Teece,
supra note 35, at 582, 589. Indeed, innovation in manufacturing processes may be
just as important for the success of a new product as the design innovations con-
ceived in the development stage. See Anthony L. Clapes, Blinded by the Light: Anti-
trust Analysis of Computer Industry Alliances, 61 ANTITRUST L.J., 899, 916 (1993).
41. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301-4305 (West Supp. 1994). H.R. 1313 passed the House of
Representatives on May 18, 1993. House Passes Bill Easing Antitrust Law for Parties
Involved in Joint Ventures, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1615, at 600
(May 20, 1993) [hereinafter House Passes Bill]. H.R. 1313 was approved by the Sen-
ate on May 28, 1993. Official Actions: Congress, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1617, at 683 (June 3, 1993). The Bill was signed by President Clinton on
June 10, 1993. See Clinton Signs Bill Easing Antitrust Law for Parties in Joint
Production Ventures, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1618, at 688:1
(June 10, 1993). The bill amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988).
42. In order to be protected by the Act, a production joint venture must have its
principal production facilities in the United States and the parties to the venture
must be United States companies or must be incorporated in nations that treat
United States companies fairly under their own antitrust laws governing production
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would not protect any production joint ventures from single
damage claims by third parties.43
Instead of the piecemeal approach taken to date, the federal
courts need to adopt a unified method of analyzing all coopera-
tive ventures among competitors. Until the courts are able to
devise a general theory that reconciles the advantages of compe-
tition and cooperation, American firms will continue to be de-
terred from entering into efficiency-enhancing joint ventures.
This Article proposes a unifying form of analysis for all coop-
erative arrangements among competitors. The proposed analysis
is consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent and could be
adopted by the federal courts without new legislation. The new
approach described in this Article can be applied rather simply
The various types of cooperative arrangements can be arrayed
along a continuum according to the degree to which they inte-
grate their partners' operations. The amount of analysis neces-
sary to determine the legality of a particular joint venture would
depend upon its location on the continuum.
Such a continuum-based approach would conserve judicial re-
sources and give better guidance to firms considering coopera-
tive arrangements. The new approach would be particularly
useful in the courts' analysis of the collectives likely to be
formed by consumers, hospitals, and physicians in response to
the Clinton Administration's health care reform program.
II. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF COOPERATION
Cooperative ventures among firms have the potential both to
restrict competition and to enhance efficiency Any effective
antitrust approach to joint ventures should begin with an under-
standing of their pernicious as well as their beneficial aspects.
A. Restrictin of Competztion
An inevitable competitive loss occurs when parties who are
rivals in a particular area suspend that rivalry in order to coop-
erate with each other. When rivals pool their resources in a




particular endeavor, they naturally will refrain from competing
with each other within the scope of that endeavor. If the part-
ners were in competition prior to the formation of the venture
or, absent the venture, eventually would have competed with
each other, the venture will eliminate competition between the
parties that otherwise would have existed.4 Thus joint ven-
tures can limit the diversity of economic objectives that fosters
innovation. At the research and development stage, for example,
a joint venture deters the participating firms from pursuing
parallel paths to develop a new technology 41 Such a venture
"conceivably could substitute a large and leisurely project for a
number of smaller, more energetic ones."46 In certain cases,
firms' collaboration on research and development may result in
lower total research spending in the relevant market.
At the downstream production and marketing stages, competi-
tors' collaboration can have even more serious anticompetitive
effects. Downstream ventures eliminate competition in the criti-
cal areas of pricing and output, which directly affect consumer
welfare.4 ' The production and marketing segments are also
44. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Corp., 378
U.S. 158 (1964), "If the parent companies are in competition, or might compete ab-
sent the joint venture, it may be assumed that neither will compete with the proge-
ny in its line of commerce." Id. at 169; see also Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d
971, 980 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that a joint agreement between two corporations,
one of which does not presently compete in the relevant market, might violate § 1 if
the noncompetitor feasibly could enter the relevant market), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
915 (1982). But see Clapes, supra note 40, at 913 (arguing that in high technology
industries, parent companies will continue to compete with their own research joint
ventures because of the possibility that a venture's development efforts may fail).
45. Some commentators have argued that parallel research projects are not waste-
ful, but rather can hasten the pace of new discoveries. See, e.g., Joseph Kattan,
Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Efficiency and the Re-
wards of Innovation, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 937, 944 (1993) (citing James Miller, Re-
search Joint Ventures, Antitrust and Industrial Innovation, Remarks Before the Ber-
lin Cartel Conference 6 (July 2, 1984)).
46. Murphy, supra note 11, at 46.
47. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 870. Moreover, if certain firms are excluded from
such a joint venture, they may be competitively disadvantaged because they could
not conduct research on the same scale as the members of the venture. LAWRENCE
A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 298-303 (1977). See infra notes
167-70 and accompanying text (discussing the anticompetitive effects of membership
restrictions).
48. The Supreme Court traditionally has applied the per se rule to restraints on
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likely to have fewer competitors than upstream research mar-
kets.49 Thus partners' natural disinclination to compete with
their own downstream joint ventures will have a greater adverse
effect on competition in the relevant market.
In certain cases, restriction of competition may not simply be
an inevitable result of a joint venture's formation. It may be the
venture's raison d'etre. Competitors may collaborate for perni-
cious as well as legitimate reasons. They may use joint ventures
as a cloak to hide various anticompetitive schemes. In the early
1970's, for example, Kodak entered into a venture with two
potential competitors, Sylvania and General Electric, to delay
the development of improved flashcubes until Kodak began to
make a matching camera. 0 The American automobile manufac-
turers formed a joint venture in the 1960's which the federal
government successfully attacked as a conspiracy to delay the
development of pollution control devices for automobiles.5
Firms should not escape antitrust liability simply by labeling
such schemes joint ventures. Indeed, the Sherman Act was de-
signed to prevent such cartel-like activity 52
Legitimate cooperative endeavors in one area of a particular
market, in certain cases, may "spill over" and adversely affect
competition in other areas.53 For example, in the course of car-
rying out the limited objectives of a production joint venture, the
partners may gain access to competitively sensitive information
pricing or output. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459
(1986) (holding per se illegal a group refusal to supply desired customer service);
Arizona v. Mancopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982) (holding per
se illegal maximum price fixing among competitors).
49. Kattan, supra note 45, at 953-54.
50. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 302 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
51. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 1969 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 72,907, at
87,456 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
52. Robin Carey, The Sherman Act: What Did Congress Intend?, 34 ANTITRUST
BULL. 337, 352 (1989).
53. For example, in United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 92
F Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950), amended by 96 F Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1951), nine
U.S. manufacturers of coated abrasives had formed a joint venture that dealt only m
export sales. Id. at 951. Nevertheless, the court was concerned that "Itihe intimate
association of the principal American producers in day-to-day manufacturing opera-




on prices, costs, customers, or marketing strategies. Such infor-
mation gives partners the ability to coordinate pricing and out-
put decisions in downstream marketing areas not covered by the
venture. 4 Joint ventures also may include express restrictions
on competition outside the bounds of the venture. Such "ancil-
lary restraints" may extend the reach of a joint venture beyond
its legitimate scope."5 The parties to a research and develop-
ment joint venture may agree not to compete against each other
in the production or marketing of products developed by the ven-
ture, and participants in a production joint venture may agree
on the prices to be charged for the output of the venture or on
the customers or territories to which each participant can mar-
ket such output.
B. Generation of Efficiencies
Cooperation among competitors does not result only in
anticompetitive effects. By collaborating with their competitors,
firms also can produce economic efficiencies which they could
not achieve on their own. In certain cases, such efficiencies can
be significant enough to outweigh the restriction of competition
that results from a cooperative endeavor. Under such circum-
stances, a joint venture will produce a net economic gain. The
critical task for the courts is to identify when such circumstanc-
es exist.
A cooperative arrangement among competitors is only capable
of generating efficiencies when the parties have achieved a true
integration of resources. No economic benefit is possible when
54. Such spillover effects can be eliminated by measures designed to insure that
the parties do not obtain access to such information. See Discussion of Joint Venture
Hypothetical B, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1197, 1208 (1985) [hereinafter Hypothetical B]
(comments of A. Paul Victor). In approving a joint venture between General Motors
and Toyota for the manufacture of a compact car in Fremont, California, the Federal
Trade Commission restricted the types of information that could be exchanged by
the parties. In re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 384 (1984); see also United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 605 F Supp. 619, 621 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (affirming a
consent decree prohibiting parties from exchanging information on customers, terms
or conditions of sale, or marketing plans). For a discussion of appropriate limitations
on the exchange of information among joint venture partners, see infra notes 171-72.
55. See Hypothetical B, supra note 54, at 1204 (describing the rule of reason anal-
ysis by which restraints collateral to a joint venture typically are evaluated).
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the parties' cooperation amounts to nothing more than a coordi-
nation of parallel activities. Partners' agreements, for example,
merely to charge a particular price, produce a specified amount
of product, or sell to a certain territory may enhance individual
firms' profits, but they will not benefit consumers in any way
Indeed, such coordination is one of the essential features of a
successful cartel."6 In order to produce efficiencies, the partners
to a joint venture must do more than simply coordinate their
conduct; they must combine their resources and share the risks
of the venture's success or failure. By virtue of such a combina-
tion, a joint venture becomes capable of producing efficiencies
beyond the ability of any of its partners. Partners' contributions
of complementary technologies to a research venture, for exam-
ple, may allow the creation of an entirely new product. The
parties' contribution of capital and other assets to a production
joint venture may enable them to produce a product which no
individual partner could have afforded to manufacture on its
own.
Antitrust analysis, therefore, should be disposed more favor-
ably toward integrated cooperative endeavors than umntegrated
ones. Unintegrated efforts by competitors to coordinate their ac-
tivities have anticompetitive effects only, and they can be
deemed illegal after a minimal analysis. A truly integrated ven-
ture, however, has the potential to produce substantial efficien-
cies, and a court should weigh those efficiencies against the
venture's anticompetitive effects before determining its legality
The integration of resources that occurs in most modern stra-
tegic alliances is sufficient to create efficiencies similar to those
that result from a merger. By virtue of their contributions to a
joint venture, the partners are able to create a new entity with
unique capabilities. These include reduction of risk, economies of
scale, elimination of duplication, access to complementary re-
sources and the enforcement of regulations necessary for the
functioning of certain markets. 7
56. The profits of the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC), for example, depend upon the members' ability to coordinate each of
their countries' crude oil production. See Floyd Norris, Harking Back to the Days of
Malaise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, at Fi.
57. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 111-12
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1. Reduction of Risk
Reduction of risk is one of the most significant efficiencies
resulting from integrated joint ventures. Joint ventures allow
small or undercapitalized firms to share with their competitors
the costs of expensive research and development and new pro-
duction facilities. Through a joint venture, such firms can par-
ticipate in new markets which they could not have afforded to
enter on their own. Nor are the risk-saving efficiencies of joint
ventures limited to small firms. The costs associated with cer-
tarn products are so high today that even America's largest com-
pames can no longer afford to develop and produce such prod-
ucts on their own. Boeing, for example, recently entered into a
joint venture with several European firms for the development
of a new jumbo jet at a cost of more than $10 billion. Both Boe-
ing and Airbus (the European aerospace consortium) had con-
sidered building the new jet separately, but neither could raise
the necessary capital on its own in the midst of a deep recession
in the aerospace industry "
The nsk-sharing that occurs in a joint venture encourages
firms to invest in innovative new processes and products. Firms
are often deterred from risking their capital to develop a new
technology out of fear that their competitors will be able to re-
verse engineer, at a much lower cost, any successful products
which result from such technology Integrated joint ventures
eliminate the fear of such "free riding." The participants in a
research and development venture can be assured that each
partner will bear a fair share of the costs of developing a new
product. If each partner is required to contribute its proportion-
ate share, no participant will be able to copy the products of the
joint venture and market them at a lower cost. 9 Thus, when
(1985); Carol Shapiro & Robert D. Willig, On the Antitrust Treatment of Production
Joint Ventures, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 114 (1990). The Merger Guidelines of the
U.S. Department of Justice recognize similar efficiencies for mergers. DOJ Merger
Guidelines, supra note 6, at 20,573-11.
58. Jeff Cole, Boeing and Two Members of Airbus Plan Jet Venture, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 5, 1993, at A3; Jeff Cole & Brian Coleman, Boeing, Four Members of Airbus to
Study Jointly Developing Jet, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1993, at A10.
59. See Kattan, supra note 45, at 953-54. In the absence of a joint venture, mis-
appropriation of new technology is particularly likely, because intellectual property
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several firms in the relevant market participate in a research
and development venture, individual firms should feel more
confident that their investments in new technologies will not be
misappropriated by their competitors.
2. Economies of Scale
Joint ventures allow smaller firms to achieve the types of
economies of scale usually available only to larger businesses.
Such efficiencies ultimately may lead to lower prices for consum-
ers. Small firms, for example, can pool their resources in joint
purchasing organizations which give them the bargaimng power
to obtain quantity discounts and other concessions from large
suppliers." By forming production joint ventures, small busi-
nesses can achieve efficiencies from scales of manufacturing
comparable to those of their larger competitors. At the market-
ing stage, strategic alliances permit local firms to engage in
advertising and promotion on a national scale.6'
3. Eliminatin of Duplicatin
The integration of partners' resources in a joint venture often
eliminates wasteful redundancies. Competitors in high technolo-
gy industries, for example, frequently pursue nearly identical
paths for the development of a new product. By combining their
research and development programs, they can avoid "shameful
and needless duplication of effort."62 Joint ventures are capable
of saving costs by combining competitors' duplicate facilities at
any stage of the production process. Overlapping warehousing
and purchasing functions, administrative services, production
laws in the United States provide only limited protection against copying by compet-
itors. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 35, at 583.
60. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284 (1985), the Court concluded that the economies of scale resulting from
a wholesale buying cooperative could reduce costs for the participants and eventually
lead to lower prices for consumers. Id. at 295.
61. Kattan, supra note 45, at 939.
62. Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Acceptable Cooperation Among Competitors
in the Face of Growing International Competition, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 529, 538 n.28
(1989) (quoting Dwight B. Davis, R&D Consortia, HIGH TECH., Oct. 1985, at 42
(quoting William Norris, Chief Executive Officer, Control Data Corp.)).
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facilities and sales organizations can all be eliminated through
joint ventures which integrate competitors' previously separate
operations. By integrating their operations, health care provid-
ers can reduce costs and improve their efficiency significantly
Doctors can eliminate overhead by sharing staff and billing
systems. Hospitals can save costs by sharing specialized equip-
ment and services such as data processing, accounting, and
purchasing. 3
4. Access to Complementary Resources
In the modern global marketplace, firms have found it in-
creasingly necessary to specialize within certain areas. Most
firms do not have the resources to become experts in all of the
technologies required of an effective global competitor. Many
firms also lack sufficient capital to acquire all of the assets nec-
essary to compete on a worldwide scale. In such a specialized
marketplace, companies often must rely on their competitors to
provide access to critical assets, technology, or areas of exper-
tise. Joint ventures allow firms to access resources outside their
areas of core competency ' In such a way, technical expertise
can be diffused throughout the relevant market. General Motors,
for example, has been able to learn more efficient Japanese
manufacturing techniques from a joint venture with Toyota for
63. See Sidney Marchasin, In California, Merger Mania Afflicts Hospitals
WALL ST. J., June 2, 1993, at A14; Rick Wartzman, Health Care Proposals Based on
Competition Are Viewed with Skepticism in Rural Areas , WALL ST. J., Apr. 16,
1993, at A16.
64. Joint ventures allow firms to make complementary assets available to their
competitors when a complete transfer of assets through a merger would not be feasi-
ble. Often a firm cannot sell an asset to a rival because it requires the asset in its
current operations, but it can transfer the asset to a joint venture partner for a
limited purpose. For example, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. ("DuPont") requires its
coatings technology for many of its current products. Phillips can utilize the technol-
ogy in the production of compact disks. Because DuPont could not sell the technol-
ogy to Phillips, the parties entered into a venture to utilize the technology jointly
for producing compact disks. Edmund W. Kitch, The Antitrust Economics of Joint
Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 957, 965 (1985). Similarly, although hospitals cannot
sell certain expensive diagnostic equipment (such as CAT-scanners or nuclear mag-
netic resonance imagers) to their competitors, they can share this equipment in a
joint venture. Jonathan M. Joseph, Note, Hospital Joint Ventures: Charting a Safe
Course Through a Sea of Antitrust Regulations, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 621, 622 (1988).
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the production of a new compact car in Fremont, Califorma.5
Indeed, General Motors currently uses such techniques as a cen-
tral component of its multibillion dollar restructuring pro-
gram."6 For its own part, Toyota learned about the North
American marketplace from General Motors, and it has used
this knowledge in establishing its own production facility in
Georgetown, Kentucky, to compete with the American automo-
bile manufacturers."7
Under certain circumstances, an asset made available through
a joint venture may permit firms' entry into a market. The Asso-
ciated Press, for example, is a type of joint venture that allows
local newspapers access to the information required to compete
with television, radio, and other mass media in the market for
world news. 8 Similarly, multiple listing services allow brokers
to obtain data on home sales necessary for them to compete in
local real estate markets. 9
In certain cases a partner may contribute a critical competi-
tive asset to a joint venture. Such joint ventures have a particu-
larly beneficial effect. They take an essential asset from the
monopoly control of a single firm and allow the asset to be
shared among several firms in the relevant market. Such a joint
venture may give a firm access to technology that bridges a
critical gap necessary for the development of a new product. For
65. Paul Ingrassia & Joseph B. White, Major Overhaul: Determined to Change,
General Motors Is Said to Pick New Chairman, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1992, at Al,
A4.
66. Id. "GM has struggled to achieve this goal for nearly a decade." Id. GM's
ability to adopt Japanese manufacturing techniques will be critical to the success of
its radical restructuring plan designed to reverse the over $12 billion in losses in-
curred in 1990 and 1991. Id. Alumni of the GM-Toyota joint venture are being
placed in key staff and operating jobs to oversee the restructuring. Id. at A4. In
trying to adopt its Japanese partner's operating techniques, GM is following in the
shoes of Chrysler, which has learned a new product development process from its
joint ventures with Honda and Mitsubishi, and Ford, which has learned more effi-
cient techniques for managing accounts payable from its own joint venture with
Mazda. Id., Jeremy Main, How to Steal the Best Ideas Around, FORTUNE, Oct. 19,
1992, at 102, 106.
67. See Paul C. Judge, Toyota Plant Is Expected for Kentucky, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
27, 1990, at D4.
68. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945).




example, until recently pharmaceutical companies were blocked
from producing a "multi-valent" childhood vaccine which would
be effective against several diseases because no single firm held
patents to each of the necessary vaccines. The formation of a
joint venture, however, gave each firm access to the necessary
patents and enabled them to produce the new vaccine."
5. Regulation of Unique Markets
Some products and services could not exist without regula-
tions concerning the manner in which they may be marketed.
Joint ventures provide a vehicle by which all the participants in
a market can coordinate the enforcement of such regulations.
Such self-regulatory organizations are pro-competitive because
they make unique products available to consumers. For example,
in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,7 an association of musical
composers had adopted rules concerning the conditions under
which their copyrighted compositions could be licensed to third
parties. 2 The Supreme Court recognized that the musical com-
positions could not have been marketed in the absence of the
venture's "integration of sales, monitoring and enforcement
against unauthorized copyright use."73 In collegiate and profes-
sional sports, leagues such as the NCAA, NFL, and NBA regu-
late team schedules, the eligibility of players, free agency, and
70. See Kattan, supra note 45, at 940 & n.18 (citing Request for Commission Ap-
proval of Proposed Joint Venture Between Pasteur Merieux Serums et Vaccms and
Merck & Co., Inc. 2-6 (Federal Trade Commission, filed Oct. 10, 1991)). Apple Com-
puter recently formed a joint venture called "General Magic Inc." with AT&T, Sony,
Motorola, Phillips Electronics, and Matsushita for the development of a personal
intelligent communicator, or "PIC." A PIC is a portable hand-held device that can
act as a beeper, fax machine, cellular telephone, note taker, and personal computer.
By making this technology available to Apple's competitors, the joint venture will
hasten the creation of industry-wide standards that will allow each firm's devices to
communicate effectively with each other. See G. Christian Hill & Ken Yamada, Five
Electronics Giants Hope General Magic Will Turn the Trick, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,
1993, at Al; see also Electronics Giants to Work on New Device, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Feb. 9, 1993, at G1. Apple's communications software is called "Telescript."
Richard Shaffer, publisher of the Computer Letter, has stated, "If [General Magic]
pulls this off, 'elescript' will be the digital version of English." Id. at G7.
71. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
72. Id. at 5.
73. Id. at 20.
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revenue sharing. As the Court pointed out in NCAA v. Board of
Regents,74 such regulations "are essential if the product is to be
available at all."7 ' Licensing and ethical standards are neces-
sary for the effective delivery of services by the legal, health,
engineering, and accounting professions. Such standards could
not be enforced in the absence of associations with authority
over all the members of a particular profession. Similarly, in
manufacturing industries, product safety codes would be ineffec-
tive without a venture among all the firms in the relevant mar-
ket.76
The cooperative arrangements being undertaken by American
firms today thus have both beneficial and adverse competitive
effects. Joint ventures among actual or potential competitors
eliminate the type of rivalry that fosters price cutting and maxi-
mizes output in the short term. But at the same time, such ven-
tures have the potential to enhance the productivity of their
partners by reducing costs, encouraging risk taking and facilitat-
ing the production of new products and services. Over the long
term, such efficiencies may lower prices and increase output
more effectively than the rivalry which was eliminated as a
consequence of the joint venture. The central challenge for the
federal judiciary is to devise a means of determinng when such
beneficial effects outweigh the immediate anticompetitive impact
of joint ventures.
74. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
75. Id. at 101.
76. Such codes have not only contributed to public safety but have also made
markets more competitive. The standardization of product quality tends to intensify
price competition and lower barriers to entry. See Jack E. Brown, Technology Joint
Ventures to Set Standards or Define Inter-faces, 61 ANTITRUST L.J., 921, 922-23
(1993) (arguing that standardized products permit ready comparison, and that m-
creased compatibility among products facilitates entry of new competitors into the
market).
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III. THE CURRENT JuDIcIAL APPROACH TO COOPERATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS
Many commentators, including this one," have criticized the
courts' inability to develop a unified theory for analyzing cooper-
ative arrangements among competitors." Indeed, the courts
have adopted three different types of approaches to joint ven-
tures. In a 1964 case, United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
Co.," the Supreme Court used a merger-based approach to ana-
lyze a joint venture.0 Such an approach requires an assess-
ment of the market power of the parties to a cooperative ar-
rangement."'
The Penn-Olin case is at odds with a series of cases in which,
beginning in 1896, the Court applied a per se analysis to cooper-
ative agreements among competitors. The Court refused in such
cases to consider the market power of the defendants or any
efficiency arguments advanced by them to justify the ar-
rangement at issue.8 2
77. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or Merger Analysis:
A New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
78. Id. at 12-18.
79. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
80. Two competitors in the sodium chlorate market, Pennsalt and Olin, had
formed a joint venture for the manufacture and sale of sodium chlorate in the
southeastern United States. Id. at 160. In analyzing the arrangement as a merger,
the Court required a consideration of the specific market effects of the venture. Id.
at 170, 176-77.
81. Id.
82. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), the
Court refused to consider whether a rate-fixing agreement among competing
railroads would enhance the efficiency of cargo transfer and scheduling. Id. at 340-
41. In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), overruled
on other grounds, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1989), the Court held that territorial and price-fixing restraints among the partners
to a European joint venture were per se illegal. Id. at 598. The Court summarily
condemned, in United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), territorial and
price-fixing restraints among small bedding manufacturers. Id. at 357-58. In Citizens
Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969), the Court found per se illegal
a joint operating agreement between Arizona's two major newspapers that would
have reduced the papers' operating costs. Id. at 135-36. The joint venture at issue in
United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972), was created by a group of
small supermarkets attempting to market a private label food brand in competition
with larger chain stores. Id. at 599. Despite the obvious efficiencies of the venture,
the Court applied the per se rule to territorial restrictions which the defendants
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In the late 1970's, the Supreme Court began to take a more
permissive approach to cooperative arrangements among com-
petitors. In 1979, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS ("BMP'), the
Court used the rule of reason to analyze the establishment, by
an association of musical composers, of a uniform license fee for
their copyrighted compositions.' The 1985 case of Northwest
Wholesale Statiners v. Pacific Statinery & Printing Co.85 also
used the rule of reason to uphold the membership rules of a pur-
chasing cooperative."8 Unfortunately, however, the Court never
explained in these cases exactly how the rule of reason analysis
should be conducted and the circumstances in which it should
apply 7 Indeed, in several other recent cases, the Court ap-
argued were necessary for the effective marketing of the new brand. Id. at 608.
Finally, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978), the Court prohibited an engineering society from implementing a ban on
competitive bidding that ostensibly was intended to promote the safety and quality
of engineering on public projects. Id. at 698-99.
83. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
84. The Court recognized that, because the licenses established an identical price
for each of the copyrighted compositions, they constituted horizontal price fixing "in
the literal sense." Id. at 8. The Court, however, concluded that "[j]omt ventures and
other cooperative arrangements are also not usually unlawful, at least not as price-
fixing schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at
all." Id. at 23.
85. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
86. Id. at 298.
87. Indeed, the courts have never been able to determine what factors should be
considered under the rule of reason and the relative weight that should be assigned
to each factor. The classic formulation of the rule of reason, set forth in 1918 in
Chicago Board of Trade v United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), was open ended.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases failed to refine the formula. In Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), for example, the Court cited the Chi-
cago Board of Trade formulation without indicating the relevance or weight to be
afforded any particular factor. Id. at 49 n.14. The courts have been split over wheth-
er market power must be considered in the rule of reason analysis of horizontal
restraints. As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, "whether the court must weigh
the market power of the antitrust defendant is a curiously confused and uncertain
area of the law." National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 603
(iith Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986). Because the relevant factors are so
undefined, a traditional rule of reason approach is of little utility in the analysis of
strategic alliances. Indeed, most judges and juries simply are not capable of making
the economic decisions required by a full rule of reason analysis. See Arizona v.
Mancopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) ("Judges often lack the
expert understanding of industrial market structures and behavior to determine with
any confidence a practice's effect on competition."). Economists themselves can argue
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peared to revert to a per se approach to cooperative arrange-
ments. In Arizona v. Martcopa County Medical Society,"5 the
Court summarily prohibited a physicians' organization from
establishing the maximum fees that its members could charge
under an insurance plan. Similarly, in FTC v. Indiana Federa-
tion of Dentzsts, 9 the Court condemned, with little analysis, a
dentist association's refusal to supply x-rays to insurance compa-
mes seeking to evaluate benefit claims.9" Finally, in NCAA v.
Board of Regents,9 the Court invalidated restrictions imposed
by the NCAA on the frequency that its member colleges' sports
teams could appear on television and the fees the colleges could
receive from the networks.
When viewed on their face, these cases appear contradictory
The Court's refusal to articulate a general theory for analyzing
cooperative arrangements among competitors has compounded
the confusion among practitioners. A closer reading, however,
indicates that the cases may be reconcilable. Indeed, one can
argue legitimately that the Court implicitly was following a new
approach to joint ventures in each of these cases. Several com-
mentators and lower federal courts have concluded that the
Court is moving toward a new synthesis for the analysis of all
cooperative arrangements among competitors.93
All of the recent Supreme Court cases dealing with coopera-
tive arrangements among competitors can be reconciled rather
simply by considering the degree to which the parties integrated
indefinitely over the single issue of what constitutes a proper product market in a
rule of reason antitrust case. One commentator has concluded that the costs of such
an analysis are not worth the effort. Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements
and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 153-54 (1984) ("[Clourts are of limit-
ed utility in examining difficult economic problems [They are] ill-equipped and
[ill-suited] for such decision-makmg [and cannot] analyze, interpret, and evaluate the
myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would surely be brought to
bear on such decisions ") (quoting Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 609-12).
88. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
89. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
90. Id. at 459.
91. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
92. Id. at 120.
93. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,
229 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Sullivan, supra note 3, at
838.
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their operations. In these cases the Court analyzed complete
combinations of the parties' operations in a particular market,
such as the sodium chlorate operations of Pennsalt and Olin in
Penn-Olin,4 in the same market-based manner as a merger.
The Court used a different type of analysis, however, when the
parties combined only a portion of their functions and remained
free to compete with each other outside the limited bounds of
their venture. In the case of such partial integrations, the Court
concentrated on the parties' competitive purpose for the arrange-
ment rather than on their market power. The Court was willing
to allow horizontal restraints on competition that were related to
partial integrations with a legitimate efficiency objective. Thus,
in BMI the Court permitted the musical composers' price-fixing
arrangement because it was an essential component of their
targeted efforts to market their compositions on a collective
basis. The Court pointed out that the composers were free to
market their compositions outside the venture if they wished,
and concluded that "[tihe blanket license, as we see it, is not a
'naked restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except stifling of
competition' but rather accompanies the integration of sales,
monitoring and enforcement against unauthorized copyright
use."95 Similarly, in Northwest Stationers, the cooperative's
membership rules were exempted from a per se rule approach
because they were necessary for the effectiveness of a limited
venture designed to enhance the parties' purchasing efficien-
cy 96
On the other hand, the Court was willing to declare illegal
any restrictions among competitors that could have no legiti-
mate efficiency objective. The Court recognized that no efficien-
cies could be achieved when the parties had not integrated their
resources in any manner. The physicians in Marcopa, for exam-
ple, could not generate any real efficiencies because they had not
94. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
95. BMI, 441 U.S. at 20 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,
263 (1963)). Some commentators have argued, however, that the integration in BMI
was minimal because the composers did not share risks or pool their capital. See,
e.g., Kevin E. Grady, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Health Care Joint Ven-
tures, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 765, 774 (1993).
96. Northwest Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295, 298.
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integrated their functions beyond those necessary to maintain a
maximum fee schedule.97 Similarly, the dentists in Indiana
Federatwn had not combined their practices in any manner.
They merely had promulgated a "work rule" forbidding the mem-
bers of the association from submitting x-rays to dental insurers
in conjunction with claim forms. The Court also struck down
horizontal competitive restrictions that were broader than re-
quired to accomplish the legitimate purpose of an integrated
arrangement. Thus, the Court prohibited the NCAA's limitations
on the number of games that could be televised and the amount
which individual colleges could be paid for television rights be-
cause such restrictions went beyond what was necessary to pre-
serve collegiate athletics.99 In each of these cases, the Court
appropriately prohibited horizontal restrictions on competition
which were unrelated to the legitimate efficiency objectives of an
integrated cooperative arrangement.
These recent cases indicate that the Supreme Court may have
begun to look beyond the traditional merger, per se, and rule of
reason standards to a new joint venture approach. The next
Section describes a proposed approach which is compatible with
this recent Supreme Court precedent.
IV A PROPOSED APPROACH
A. The Continuum of Joint Venture Analysis
The new approach proposed in this Article, like the analysis
adopted implicitly in recent Supreme Court decisions, would
turn on the degree of integration achieved by the parties in a
joint venture. The outcome of the courts' analysis should depend
97. As the Court stated,
[The doctors' arrangements] are not analogous to partnerships or
other joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be com-
petitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the op-
portunities for profit [Tihe fee agreements disclosed by the re-
cord are among independent competing entrepreneurs. They fit
squarely into the horizontal price-fixing mold.
Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356-57.
98. Indiana Federation, 476 U.S. at 451.
99. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99-100.
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upon the extent to which the parties have combined their re-
sources to accomplish a legitimate efficiency objective. Such
integration reveals both the efficiencies and anticompetitive
effects likely to be generated by a particular arrangement. Econ-
onues of scale, elimination of duplication, reduction of risk, ac-
cess to complementary assets-none of these efficiencies can be
accomplished unless the parties combine their resources in some
manner. Firms cannot create new products or services, nor can
they provide existing products or services more efficiently, if
they do not achieve such integration."' At the same time, inte-
gration is also a proxy for anticompetitive effects. The greater
the degree of integration present in a joint venture, the greater
its potential to reduce competition. When the parties combine
only a portion of their operations to accomplish a specific objec-
tive, (such as research and development, enhanced purchasing,
or increased manufacturing efficiencies), not all competition
among the parties will be eliminated. They remain free to con-
tinue to compete with each other outside the limited bounds of
the venture. However, more integrated ventures that merge all
of their partners' operations in the relevant market will elimi-
nate all competition among the participants.
Integration, therefore, should be the critical factor in the
courts' analysis of joint ventures. The courts can target their
analysis most effectively by arraying the different types of coop-
erative arrangements along a continuum based upon the degree
of integration achieved by the parties. The amount of analysis
necessary to confirm the legality of a particular venture would
depend upon its location on the continuum.
100. See supra notes 56-76 and accompanying text. The efficiencies resulting from
integration are best illustrated by an example. If two competing hospitals simply
agreed that Hospital "A" would provide one service, while Hospital "B" would pro-
vide another, the "venture" would do nothing more than restrict competition between
the two hospitals. Such an arrangement lacks any integration of resources and
should be treated harshly under the antitrust laws. However, if the hospitals agreed
to a more complex arrangement under which they combined certain of their opera-
tions, they would have the ability to improve patient services. The hospitals, for ex-
ample, could reduce their costs by merging their purchasing functions, or they could
provide a broader range of care by sharing expensive diagnostic equipment. Antitrust




Umntegrated joint ventures are organized in simple ways that
make their competitive effects obvious. A court will have to
engage in only a minimal inquiry into such arrangements. The
courts need not consider their beneficial effects because they
produce none. Such arrangements can be deemed illegal simply
on the basis of the parties' conduct.
More integrated cooperative arrangements are structured in a
more complex manner that obscures their competitive effects.
The courts will have to engage in a more detailed balancing of
such ventures' efficiencies and anticompetitive effects. For this
reason, the amount of judicial analysis should increase along a
spectrum of progressively more integrated joint ventures. Such a
continuum can be visualized as follows:
Degree of Necessary Inquiry
Conduct Alone Conduct Plus Conduct, Purpose
Determinative Purpose Considered and Market PowerConsidered
No Integration Partial Integration Complete Integration
(Cartels) (True Joint Ventures) (Mergers)
Amount of Integration
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Unintegrated cooperative arrangements would occupy the
extreme left of the continuum and would require the least
amount of inquiry Because they do not combine the parties'
operations in any manner, such arrangements are incapable of
producing efficiencies. Their only effect is to restrict competition.
The outcome of the analysis of umntegrated arrangements is
obvious. Such arrangements are indistinguishable from cartels
and should be deemed illegal on the basis of the parties' conduct
alone.
Occupying the middle of the continuum would be true joint
ventures in which the parties have partially integrated their
resources to achieve a legitimate efficiency objective. This cate-
gory would include most modern strategic alliances among man-
ufacturing firms for the development or production of new prod-
ucts as well as most networks of health care consumers and
providers. Partial integration makes such joint ventures unlike
either a cartel or a merger. In contrast to a cartel, a true joint
venture allows the parties to combine their resources to generate
economic efficiencies which benefit consumers. And unlike a
merger, a partially integrated joint venture achieves such effi-
ciencies without completely elinnating competition between the
parties.1°1
In light of these unique competitive characteristics, the courts
should fashion a special approach for partially integrated joint
ventures. Such an approach should center on a consideration of
the parties' competitive purpose. If the parties propose to
achieve an efficiency which they could not have reached on their
101. Thus it is appropriate for the courts and enforcement agencies to apply a
more permissive approach to partial integrations than to complete integrations:
J]oint ventures may pose less of a threat to competition than a merger
involving the same parties. The antitrust enforcement agencies have per-
mitted some joint ventures to proceed in circumstances in which they
had or would have challenged a merger of the same parties. These deci-
sions were grounded in the belief that restrictions on the scope and du-
ration of joint ventures limit their anticompetitive effects. Unlike merg-
ers, joint ventures may maintain the participants' status as independent
competitors outside the framework of the collaborative effort.
PLI Conference Explores Ins and Outs of Federal Agencies' Antitrust Enforcement, 63
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1591, at 615, 623 (Nov. 19, 1992) [hereinaf-
ter PLI Conference] (comments of Joseph Kattan).
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own, such as the creation of a new product or entry into a new
market, courts should uphold the venture without any further
balancing of its efficiencies and anticompetitive effects. Such
arrangements clearly have a net beneficial effect. They promote
long-term competitiveness by facilitating the parties' entry into
new markets. Indeed, in the absence of such ventures, the par-
ties would have been unable to participate in the new market.
Such ventures also do not restrict rivalry in any manner, be-
cause they cover areas in which their partners otherwise could
not have competed. If, however, the parties intend to use a joint
venture to enhance their efficiency in markets in which they al-
ready operate, the venture will have certain adverse effects.
Within the scope of the joint venture's operation, competition
that formerly existed among the partners will be eliminated. In
such a case the courts should balance such anticompetitive ef-
fects against the efficiencies that the venture is likely to gener-
ate.
An even fuller judicial inquiry is appropriate for completely
integrated arrangements. When the parties contribute all of
their operations in a particular market to a joint venture, all
competition between them in that market will be eliminated.
Indeed, completely integrated joint ventures have the same
anticompetitive effects as mergers. Since these arrangements
represent a complete fusion of their partners' operations, it is
appropriate for the courts to consider the parties' market power
as well as their competitive purpose. By determining the parties'
share of the relevant market, a court can assess the potential
anticompetitive effect of a fully integrated venture. It then can
balance that adverse impact against the efficiencies that the
venture is likely to generate.
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B. Placing Specific Ventures on the Contznuum
Courts should have little difficulty in deternnmng where spe-
cific cooperative arrangements should lie on the continuum of
joint venture analysis. At the unintegrated end of the continu-
um, the courts easily could identify naked arrangements with no
legitimate efficiency objectives. Traditionally, the courts have
been able to differentiate between legitimate and "sham" joint
ventures." 2 Naked horizontal agreements not to compete,
worldwide divisions of territories effected through patent cross-
licensing, joint sales agencies designed to fix competitors' prices,
and agreements to forego competitive bidding have all been
found per se illegal despite the defendants' arguments that they
were engaged in a "joint venture."' 3
At the other extreme of the joint venture continuum, complete
integrations also could be identified easily In order to achieve a
complete integration, the parties must contribute all of their
operations in the relevant market to the joint venture and cease
all previous rivalry
At the middle of the continuum, the distinction between
umntegrated cartels and partially integrated joint ventures
usually should be readily apparent. The easiest cases would be
those in which the parties contribute assets such as technology,
capital or facilities to a venture or when they jointly assume the
financial risks of the venture. Under such circumstances, the
parties clearly will have pooled their resources to establish a
new competitive entity In other cases, the parties may not con-
102. In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), for exam-
ple, the aggregate of price fixing and territorial restraints between the parties made
it clear that the parties' attempt "to suppress competition among themselves and
others [could not] be justified by labeling the project a joint venture.' " Id. at 598.
103. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-
93 (1978) (holding the foregoing of competitive bidding per se illegal); United States
v. Dynalectnc Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding the foregoing of
competitive bidding illegal), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989); Virgima Excelsior
Mills, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 256 F.2d 538, 540 (4th Cir. 1958) (finding a
joint sales agency agreement per se illegal); United States v. Capitol Serv. Inc., 568
F Supp. 134, 153 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (deeming agreements not to compete among
movie theaters per se illegal), affd, 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
945 (1985); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F Supp. 513, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
1945) (holding patent cross-licensing per se illegal).
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tribute any assets to a venture or assume any identifiable risks,
but simply may agree to coordinate their efforts in certain ways.
A mere coordination of parallel activities, however, is not a form
of integration sufficient to qualify for joint venture treatment.
When competitors do nothing more than coordinate their behav-
ior, there -is no guarantee that their arrangement will generate
efficiencies. Indeed, by coordinating their efforts, the parties
may be attempting simply to insure the effectiveness of an
anticompetitive scheme. The members of price-fixing cartels
must agree on some minimum level of coordination and enforce-
ment in order to be successful. °4 Thus, as the Department of
Justice has recognized, a true joint venture must "involve some
economic integration of the venture members' operations beyond
the mere coordination of their pricing and output decisions."' 5
In order to qualify as a partially integrated joint venture, a
cooperative arrangement should include, at a minimum, the
joining together of functions previously performed separately by
the parties. Arrangements that combine their partners' purchas-
ing, research, production, or marketing operations are capable of
reducing costs, producing synergies, and achieving other efficien-
cies. Such arrangements, however, need not involve a significant
contribution of assets or sharing of financial risk. The associa-
tion of musical composers in Broadcast Muszc, Inc. v. CBS
0 6
was viewed as a legitimate joint venture simply because the
individual copyright owners had joined their monitoring and en-
forcement efforts against unauthorized use of their musical
compositions.'0 ' Similarly, under this standard, an agreement
104. Indeed, the courts often use such coordination and enforcement to infer the
existence of a per se illegal price-fixing conspiracy. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968) (inferring a price-fixing conspiracy when a newspaper lured
outside agents to enforce maximum resale prices); United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45 (1960) (inferring an illegal conspiracy from wholesalers' policing
and enforcement of suggested retail prices).
105. See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations-1988, 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 13,109, at 20,621 (Apr. 14, 1992) (Illustrative Case 5).
106. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
107. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. In certain cases, however, the
courts have been too permissive in their analysis of the minimum amount of inte-
gration necessary to classify a cooperative arrangement as a legitimate joint venture.
For example, the court in Polk Brothers, Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, 776 F.2d
185 (7th Cir. 1985), upheld a noncompetition covenant between two stores located
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among physicians or hospitals to combine their purchasing, bill-
ing, .or other admimstrative functions in order to reduce transac-
tion costs should be analyzed as a joint venture rather than as a
cartel."8
V ANALYSIS AT THE MARGINS: NAKED ARRANGEMENTS AND
MERGERS
Naked agreements to restrict competition and complete merg-
ers of competitors' operations lie at opposite ends of the joint
venture continuum. Naked agreements are the easiest cooper-
ative arrangements to analyze because they generate no efficien-
cies. Completely integrated arrangements, on the other hand,
require the most complex judicial inquiry because they produce
substantial efficiencies while eliminating all competition among
their partners.
A. Unintegrated Arrangements
The courts need not waste their resources in a detailed inqui-
ry into the antitrust implications of cooperative arrangements
unaccompanied by any form of integration. In the absence of
integration, there are no economic efficiencies to balance against
the restriction of competition caused by such arrangements.
Naked restraints have no redeeming value; their only effect is to
restrict competition. The outcome of the antitrust analysis of
such restraints is obvious. The courts can confirm their illegality
simply on the basis of the parties' conduct. Indeed, cartel-like
conduct can be deemed illegal on its face under a traditional per
se approach."0 9 Naked price fixing, territorial allocations, and
next to each other in the same building. Id. at 195. There was not even a modicum
of sharing by the stores' owners of assets, risks or operations. Id. at 187. It is diffi-
cult to distinguish such a "joint venture" from the garden variety naked agreement
to allocate territories.
108. See Physician Agreements to Control Medical Prepayment Plans, 46 Fed. Reg.
48,982, 48,988 (1981).
109. As one commentator has pointed out:
[O]utside the context of some kind of joint venture activity, competitors
have no legitimate reason for agreeing with one another about what
course of action to follow and there is no need for courts to "set sail
on a sea of doubt" about whether such agreements might create an un-
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divisions of customers, for example, are so obviously
anticompetitive and so devoid of efficiencies that they can be
summarily prohibited."' Agreements by buyers on the prices
they will pay, without any integration of purchasing operations
that will reduce the buyers' costs, create no cognizable efficien-
cies and should be deemed illegal without any further inquiry
Similarly, producers may organize for the simple purpose of
resisting buyers' demands for discounts or other cost contain-
ment measures. Because such arrangements are not ancillary to
any productive integration, they should be precluded after a
minimal judicial inquiry .
B. Complete Integratzons
At the other extreme of the joint venture continuum lie ar-
rangements that are so integrated that they completely elimi-
nate competition between the parties in the relevant market.
Instead of contributing only a portion of their resources to a
venture formed for a limited purpose, the parties may combine
all of the resources which they use to operate in a particular
market. A recent alliance between a domestic and a foreign
airline provides a good example of such a fully integrated ar-
rangement. Northwest Airlines and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
have asked the Department of Transportation to approve an
agreement under which they would operate, in effect, as a single
airline."2 The two airlines would coordinate pricing, combine
their sales forces, share information on seat availability, and
share revenue."' They might even fly under the same
name."' When competitors join their production and market-
reasonable restraint on competition.
George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807, 810 (1992).
110. As the Supreme Court pointed out m NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984), "[a]s a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify
a naked restriction on price or output." Id. at 109.
111. See Mark J. Horoschak, Antitrust Perspectives on Joint Ventures Among
Health Care Providers, Remarks Before Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar
Ass'n, San Francisco, California 7-8, 13-14 (Aug. 11, 1992).
112. See Agis Salpukas, Plan Set in Norwest KLM Link, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1992, at D1.
113. Id.
114. Id. at D17.
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ing operations in such a complete manner, courts should analyze
the arrangement like a merger."' As in a merger, a single en-
tity (the joint venture) takes the place of the former competitors
in the relevant market. These transactions have the same com-
petitive effect as an acqisition of one partner's business by the
other, and they should be subject to the same antitrust stan-
dard: a market-based analysis to determine their specific impact
on competition in the relevant market.
Fully integrated joint ventures, like mergers, may result in
undue concentrations of market power which raise the risk of
collusion among the remaining firms in the relevant market."'
Complete integrations among firms with substantial market
shares also reduce overall competition in a market and limit the
pressure on the remaining firms to improve and innovate." '
Thus, joint ventures which are just as integrated as mergers
should not be permitted among firms with substantial market
power. The market power tests adopted by the Department of
Justice for mergers, which consider such factors as the parties'
115. Many courts have applied merger analysis to joint ventures that eliminate all
commercial rivalry between their partners. In Citizen Publishing Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969), the combination of two newspapers' advertising and
circulation functions precluded future competition. Id. at 134. In his concurring opin-
ion, Justice Harlan noted that if the operating agreement between the two papers
had provided that it would continue indefinitely "we would have had no choice but
to treat the transaction in the same way we would treat a total corporate merger."
Id. at 141- (Harlan, J., concurring). In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131 (1948), competition was eliminated by a joint committee's pooling of the
profits of formerly competitive movie theaters. Id. at 149. In United States v. Ivaco,
Inc., 704 F Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989), the district court applied a merger analy-
sis to a joint venture to which two manufacturers contributed their entire railroad
track equipment business. Id. at 1414-30. The court distinguished its analysis from
the more permissive approach that would have been appropriate if the companies
merely had entered into a limited venture for research and development that left
them free to compete m other areas of the railroad track equipment business. Id. at
1426.
116. See DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 6, 13,104, § 2.0, at 20,573-76.
117. Indeed, firms in concentrated domestic industries may lose the competitive
edge necessary to be effective in export markets. A recent study by the Harvard
Business School found that compames that are most successful in global competition
"compete vigorously at home and pressure each other to improve and innovate."
Richard Steuer, Getting It Backward on Antitrust, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at F13.
Another study concluded that Japanese companies that had done well in export
markets first "honed their teeth in fierce domestic competition." Id.
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market shares, changes in industry concentration levels result-
ing from a merger, and ease of entry in the relevant market, are
also appropriate for fully integrated joint ventures.118
In addition to concentrating market power, however, fully
integrated ventures also generate substantial efficiencies. When
the parties combine all of their operations in a particular mar-
ket, waste and duplication of effort are eliminated, economies of
scale are produced, and complementary assets are combined in
ways that may produce entirely new products. If the parties to a
joint venture do not have substantial market power, such effi-
ciencies may outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the venture.
Firms lacking market power cannot restrain competition unrea-
sonably in the relevant market by combimng their opera-
tions.' Thus, the balance should shift in favor of the legality
of complete integrations among firms with small market shares.
The courts should establish a market share threshold for the
legality of fully integrated joint ventures. Such joint ventures
should be upheld when the parties' combined market shares are
below a particular percentage.2 ° Such a "safe harbor" approach
would simplify market power analysis and give better guidance
on the legality of particular joint ventures. Considerable prece-
dent supports a market share threshold of twenty to twenty-five
percent for "vertical" restraints between a supplier and its cus-
tomers."' Fully integrated joint ventures among competitors
118. See DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 6, % 13,104, § 1, at 20,571; id. § 3, at
20,573-9; id. § 4, at 20,573-11.
119. Thomas Jorde, Remarks Before Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Ass'n,
San Francisco, California 2-3 (Aug. 11, 1992). .,
120. A few federal courts have held that joint ventures among firms that lack mar-
ket power cannot be deemed illegal. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van
Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1987); see
also National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 604 (iith Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
121. The vertical restraint cases defining a market share threshold include Assam
Drug Co. v Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 318 n.18 (8th Cir. 1986); O.S.C. Corp.
v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F Supp. 1274, 1291 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aftd, 792
F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F
Supp. 750, 761 (D. Md.), affd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864
(1981); see also Ryco Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1231-32 & n.14 (8th
Cir. 1987) (discussing the applicable case law), cert. denzed, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988);
Hand v. Central Transp., Inc., 779 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1985) (agreeing with the con-
cept of market share threshold); Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d
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who collectively do not possess more than such a share of the
relevant market pose little, if any, competitive risk while pro-
ducing substantial efficiencies, and therefore should be permit-
ted.122
The partners to fully integrated joint ventures may have mar-
ket shares that are above the safe harbor threshold, but below
the point at which substantial market power can be inferred. In
such cases the courts should balance the efficiencies of the ven-
ture against its potential anticompetitive effects. The venture's
adverse effects will be evident from the partners' collective mar-
ket power. Relevant efficiencies will include factors such as cost
savings, risk reduction, and synergies from the combination of
complementary assets which will make the integrated entity a
more effective long-term competitor than any of its partners
could have been on their own.
VI. THE ANALYSIS OF PARTIALLY INTEGRATED JOINT VENTURES
Partially integrated cooperative arrangements are located at
the midpoint of the continuum between naked agreements
among competitors and complete mergers of competitors' opera-
tions. Partial integration is the defining characteristic of most
strategic alliances which American firms undertake today Such
alliances are alternatives both to a "go it alone" and a merger
strategy Partial integrations allow firms to access their rivals'
resources without losing their competitive independence. Such
alliances are unlike naked agreements because the parties have
an efficiency objective beyond the mere enhancement of their
short-term profits. They are distinguished from mergers by the
parties' ability to continue their separate operations outside the
limited bounds of their venture. Because such partial integra-
tions promote efficiency, they should not be precluded summari-
ly in the manner of cartels. Because they permit continued com-
petition between their partners, they should not be subject to a
merger-based market analysis.
1560, 1568 & n.10 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting the applicable case law).
122. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 6, at 63.
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The legality of partially integrated joint ventures should be
determined on the basis of the parties' competitive purpose,
rather than by a full market-based analysis. Market power anal-
ysis requires a fact-intensive assessment of the relevant product
and geographic markets, each of the parties' shares of those
markets, their competitors' market shares, and any increase in
market concentration that will result from a transaction.'23
Such an approach is unnecessarily complicated for partial inte-
grations. Indeed, market share analysis is unlikely to reveal the
actual competitive effects of a partial integration. Such an analy-
sis assumes that the parties to a transaction have completely
fused their market power, as in a merger. However, such a fu-
sion does not occur in most partial integrations, because the
parties remain free to continue to compete with each other out-
side the limited bounds of the venture. IBM and Apple, for ex-
ample, have formed an alliance to develop a new computer oper-
ating system, but their cooperation in this one area has not
deterred them from continuing to compete aggressively in other
computer markets.124 General Motors and Toyota have contin-
123. See DOJ Merger Guidelines, supra note 6, %1 3,104, § 1, at 20,572 to 20,573-6
(defining product and geographic markets); see also PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW I 907(a) (1978); Mary L. Azcuenaga, Market Power as a
Screen in Evaluating Horizontal Restraints, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 935, 940-41 (1992).
These determinations are time consuming, and their outcome is difficult to predict.
See Phillip Areeda, The Changing Contours of the Per Se Rule, 54 ANTITRUST L.J.
27, 28 (1985); see also Richard Markovits, The American Antitrust Laws on the Cen-
tennial of the Sherman Act, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 673, 752 (1990) (arguing that "market-
oriented approaches are inevitably cost-ineffective"). The courts have not even been
able to agree on a definition of what constitutes market power. In United States v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), the Supreme Court stated that
market power is the "power to control prices or exclude competition." Id. at 391
(emphasis added). Some lower courts, however, have adopted a test requiring that a
firm "control prices and exclude competition." White & White, Inc. v. American
Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Richter Concrete
Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 1982)) (emphasis added);
accord Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 692 F.2d 307, 311 (3rd Cir.
1982). The courts also have not succeeded in defining the market share threshold at
which market power should be deemed to exist. See Hay, supra note 109, at 826.
124. Microsoft and Apple are currently in an alliance under which Microsoft sup-
plies software for Apple's Macintosh computers. Stratford Sherman, Are Strategic
Alliances Working?, FORTUNE, Sept. 21, 1992, at 78. This alliance has not prevented
Apple from alleging in a lawsuit that Microsoft's "Windows" software was developed
as a result of a theft of Apple's trade secrets. Id. As Steven Ballmer, Senior Vice-
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ued to compete just as fiercely despite their joint venture for the
production of a compact automobile. 2 If a merger-based ap-
proach had been used to analyze the GM-Toyota joint venture,
this cooperative arrangement between the first and third largest
automobile companies in the world certainly would have been
prohibited. The joint venture demonstrates, however, that com-
petition in the relevant market is not always substantially pre-
cluded by partial integrations among firms with large market
shares. 2
President of Microsoft explained, "I feel fine about that. This is business. We're not
allied with Apple out of love." Id.
Similarly, U.S. West's joint venture with Time-Warner for various telecommum-
cations services in the United States has not prevented U.S. West from allying with
other companies in foreign countries. As a U.S. West executive recently stated, "You
very much have to accept that you are going to compete against a company in some
places and cooperate in others." Yoder & Zachary, supra note 18, at A4.
125. GM has used knowledge acquired from the joint venture to hone its manufac-
turing techniques, and Toyota has used such knowledge to aid it in making automo-
biles at a new plant in Kentucky. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
One commentator has explained:
Part of Japan's advantage is that it often does view the ventures as
largely another form of competition. You shake hands with your right
hand, while making a fist with your left. You learn everything you can
from your Western partner while keeping as many of your own secrets to
yourself. Then you strike out on your own, sometimes in the very market
once controlled by your partner.
Bernard Wysocki, Jr., Cross-Border Alliances Become Favorite Way to Crack New
Markets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1990, at Al.
126. Antitrust law, therefore, should be more hospitable to joint ventures than to
mergers. Although the Supreme Court applied a merger-based analysis in Penn-Olin,
it did acknowledge that joint ventures are not as anticompetitive as mergers:
This is not to say that the joint venture is controlled by the same crite-
ria as the merger or conglomeration. The merger eliminates one of the
participating corporations from the market while a joint venture creates a
new competitive force therein.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Corp., 378 U.S. 158, 170 (1964) (citations
omitted).
A few lower federal courts have recognized that joint ventures have less of an
anticompetitive effect than mergers. A joint venture between Alcan and Arco for the
production of aluminum, for example, was approved as a less restrictive alternative
to the complete merger of the aluminum production businesses of the two companies.
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,427 (W.D. Ky.
1985). One commentator has concluded, however, that antitrust law treats joint ven-
tures even more harshly than mergers. Professor Brodley argues that mergers usual-
ly are challenged only at their inception, while antitrust regulators can challenge
joint ventures at any time while they remain in effect. Joseph F Brodley, Antitrust
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A market power approach is also inappropriate for partial
integrations because it is backward looking. Market power anal-
ysis measures the parties' historical shares of the relevant mar-
ket, but it reveals nothing about new market conditions that
may exist during and after the term of a joint venture."7 Be-
cause partially integrated ventures promote long term efficien-
cies, their specific impact on the relevant market will not be
determinable until some time in the future.2 ' Indeed, some
joint ventures may alter the contours of the market on their
own, for they may make possible the introduction of entirely
new products and services.'29
Unlike market power analysis, a purpose-based standard
effectively reveals the future competitive effects which are likely
to result from a partial integration. The parties' objectives for a
venture should be a reliable indicator of the arrangement's pro-
spective competitive effect." Indeed, the parties' purpose for a
and Innovation Cooperation, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer-Fall 1990, at 97, 108; see also
Kattan, supra note 45, at 947 (noting that joint ventures often pose less of a threat
to competition than a merger).
127. See Hay, supra note 109, at 821.
128. Discussion of Joint Venture Hypothetical A, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1157, 1166
(1985) (comments of Don T. Hibner, Jr.).
129. One commentator has pointed out that market share evaluation may have
little value in the case of research and development ventures because "R & D com-
petition may involve the development of an entirely new product, in which case no
competitor would have any market share." PLI Conference, supra note 101, at 624
(comments of Joseph Kattan).
130. Courts and commentators have recognized that the prospective market impact
of horizontal restraints can often be inferred from the purpose of the parties to the
restraints. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) ("[Olur
inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here because it tends to show ef-
fect the purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation of our
predominantly free-market economy ") (citation omitted); Chicago Professional
Sports, Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 91 69,308, at
65,171 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("Knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts
and to predict consequences.") (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 239 (1918)); see also New England Conference Finds More Reality than
Rhetoric in Promises for Enforcement, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1490, at 663, 669 (Nov. 8, 1990) (comments of Eleanor Fox) ("Purpose is often a
good key to determining probable effect."). Many antitrust commentators, however,
believe that purpose is not a valid indicator of future competitive effects and that a
market-based inquiry should be given greater priority. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, A
Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1622 (1986)
("Purpose will be multifaceted and hard to determine.").
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joint venture, by itself, often will reveal the ultimate competitive
impact of the arrangement. If the parties intend to use a joint
venture to produce a new product or enter a new market from
which they were individually foreclosed, a court need not inquire
further. The long-term beneficial effects of facilitating entry into
a new market will outweigh any short-term restriction of compe-
tition that may occur. The analysis will be slightly more compli-
cated for partial integrations whose purpose is to enhance the
parties' efficiency in existing markets, yet it still should fall
short of a full market power analysis. In such cases, in addition
to the parties' purpose for a joint venture, the courts must weigh
the specific efficiencies and anticompetitive effects likely to re-
sult from the cooperative arrangement. The net balance of effi-
ciencies and anticompetitive effects, however, can be determined
from easily identifiable factors such as the degree of integration
achieved by the parties and the venture's relationship to the
production and marketing stages of the product cycle.
A. Joint Ventures Facilitating New Entry
If a firm cannot participate in a market or produce a product
other than through a joint venture, the venture will have an
obvious beneficial effect. Such arrangements promote competi-
tion by permitting "the introduction of a new competitor that
otherwise might never have come into being."' 3' Because these
131. Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on
the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1007, 1018 (1969). Indeed, one court
has concluded that the distinguishing feature of a partially integrated joint venture
is its "capability in terms of new productive capacity, new technology, a new prod-
uct, or entry into a new market." Compact v. Metropolitan Gov't, 594 F Supp. 1567,
1574 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (quoting Joseph F Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust
Policy, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1523, 1526 (1982)). Professor Brodley has defined a joint
venture as
an integration between firms that involves a clear addition to productive
capacity, as distinct from a mere union of existing operations. Thus, a
joint venture is more than a marriage; it is a marriage that at the mo-
ment of consummation immediately produces a child. A convenient legal
test is whether, as in Broadcast Music, the undertaking involves the
creation of a new product or entry into a new market-or "a new
competitive dimension."
Joseph F Brodley, Analyzing Joint Ventures with Foreign Partners, 53 ANTITRUST
L.J. 73, 75 (1984) (quoting JAMES A. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST
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ventures cover areas in which their partners could not have
competed in the absence of the venture, they also do not elinn-
nate competition that otherwise would exist among their part-
ners. The only effects of such arrangements are beneficial, and
they should be upheld without any detailed balancing of efficien-
cies against anticompetitive effects.'32 The courts' only inquiry
need be whether the parties' purpose for the joint venture was to
develop a new product or enter a new market from which they
were individually foreclosed.
Under the continuum of joint venture analysis, many research
and development ventures should qualify for a simple purpose-
based determination of legality Ventures that enable their part-
ners to develop new products obviously benefit consumers, and
further inquiry is unnecessary once a court has confirmed the
parties' pro-competitive purpose. High technology research and
development ventures such as the Semiconductor Research Cor-
poration (a venture pursuing applied electronics research) or
Sematech (an electronics consortium funded by private firms
and the Department of Defense) should raise no antitrust issues
because their purpose is to develop new electronics technologies
which their partners could not develop on their own."' Simi-
AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 12.33 (2d ed. 1981), and citing Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1979)).
132. Certain Supreme Court decisions have recognized implicitly the legality of joint
ventures that facilitate entry into new markets. In Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), the Court did not question the legality of the venture
itself because, according to one commentator, "few, if any, newspapers would have
been sufficiently affluent to perform the news gathering services provided by the AP
joint venture." Pitofsky, supra note 131, at 1057-58. In its per curain decision fol-
lowing remand in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Corp., 389 U.S. 308 (1967),
affg 246 F Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), the Supreme Court upheld the joint venture
after the district court found that neither Pennsalt nor Olin was likely to have en-
tered the sodium chlorate market in the Southeast in the absence of the joint ven-
ture. See Penn-Olin, 246 F Supp. at 933. Similarly, the Court ruled in Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), that the issuance of blanket licenses by the
musical composers' association did not constitute a per se violation of antitrust laws
because none of the composers could have marketed their music without the blanket
license. BMI, 441 U.S. at 18-19. Finally, in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984), the Court did not challenge the legitimacy of the collegiate athletic organiza-
tion itself because, in its absence, member colleges could not have participated effec-
tively in amateur athletics. Id. at 101-02.
133. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 6, at 35.
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larly, the current joint venture between IBM and Apple, aimed
at challenging Microsoft in the development of a new generation
of operating software for computers, has an obviously beneficial
purpose and effect. The venture will permit the parties to com-
bine the best characteristics of their current operating systems
in order to produce an entirely different approach. 3 1 Certain
production joint ventures also should be upheld after a similar
truncated inquiry Ventures that permit their partners to manu-
facture new products or expand capacity can only promote com-
petition in the relevant market. Like research and development
joint ventures for new products, capacity-enhancing production
joint ventures increase the variety and quantity of products
available to consumers. A recent joint venture between AT&T
and NEC,131 for example, clearly will have a beneficial effect in
the computer industry The venture will allow the parties to
produce new types of computer chips by combining AT&T's com-
puter aided design technology with NEC's technology for ad-
vanced logic chips.'36 In certain industries, manufacturing
costs are so great that firms cannot afford to expand capacity
other than through production joint ventures. New computer
chip factories, which can cost up to $500 million, are being con-
structed in the United States today only because of joint ven-
tures among computer manufacturers.'37 Similarly, a joint ven-
ture among Boeing and several European aerospace manufac-
turers is making possible the production of a new jumbo jet. 8
In some cases, even downstream marketing joint ventures
allow firms to enter new markets or produce new products. In-
deed, certain unique products can be marketed only through a
joint venture. A venture that allows the marketing of such a
product cannot restrict competition because, in the absence of
the venture, the relevant product would never have existed. In
denying a per se approach in BMI, for example, the Supreme
134. The joint venture, called Taligent Inc., is ahead of schedule and plans to deliv-
er its first operating system m 1994. See G. Pascal Zachary, IBM-Apple Operating
System, Taligent, Is Ahead of Schedule, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1993, at B12.
135. Wysocki, supra note 124, at Al.
136. Id.
137. Eisen, supra note 34, at 264.
138. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Court pointed out that the blanket license was a type of "dif-
ferent product" and that the composers' arrangement was "nec-
essary to market the product at all."139 Sports leagues also con-
stitute a type of marketing joint venture necessary for the exis-
tence of a unique product. Neither collegiate nor professional
athletics could operate without a league orgamzation. Leagues
regulate the various activities required to carry on a sport: the
number of persons on a team, the rules of play, restrictions on
player mobility, and revenue sharing. The Supreme Court recog-
nized in the NCAA case that such league rules "are essential if
the product is to be available at all."140 Because they make
possible the marketing of a unique product, amateur and profes-
sional sports leagues do not offend the antitrust laws. The
only relevant antitrust issue for such leagues is whether their
related restraints on competition are no broader than required
to effect the legitimate interests of individual teams in maintain-
ing the viability of the sport."'
139. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 22, 23 (1979).
140. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
141. The Eighth Circuit, in Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977), concluded that "the NFL assumes some
of the characteristics of a joint venture" and that "the unique nature of the business
of professional football renders it inappropriate to mechanically apply per se illegali-
ty rules." Id. at 619. One commentator has pointed out that sports leagues have less
of an anticompetitive potential than other types of joint ventures because the parties
conduct no business activity independent of their joint enterprise; therefore, there is
no risk of anticompetitive "spillover" effects outside the scope of the venture. See
Gary R. Roberts, The Antitrust Status of Sports Leagues Revisited, 64 TUL. L. REV.
117, 129 (1989). Robert Bork has stated that "[slome activities can only be carried
out jointly. Perhaps the leading example is league sports. When a league of profes-
sional lacrosse teams is formed, it would be pointless to declare their cooperation
illegal on the ground that there are no other professional lacrosse teams." ROBERT
H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 278 (1978).
142. The success of a sports league depends upon the maintenance of "competitive
balance" among its various teams. Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadel-
phia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F Supp. 462, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In order to maintain
such competitive balance, professional sports leagues must control not only the rules
of the game but also player mobility and the financial capabilities of individual
teams. If teams in large markets are able to become financially dominant and to
attract the most competent players, the entire league will suffer from the resulting
competitive imbalance. The courts still have not determined the specific types of
restrictions on player movement and compensation that should be permitted to pre-
serve competitive balance in professional sports. In Mackey, a court Itruck down the
"Rozelle Rule," which required any team acquiring a free agent to compensate the
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B. Joint Ventures That Restrict Rivalry
1. The Need for a Balancing Approach
Joint ventures which enable their partners to develop a new
technology, produce a new product, expand capacity or market a
umque item are so pro-competitive that they should be upheld
without any inquiry beyond the parties' competitive purpose.
Such ventures expand the total output of goods and services
available to consumers. A more detailed balancing test is neces-
sary, however, for joint ventures whose purpose is to enhance
their partners' efficiencies in markets in which they are already
competing. Joint ventures in existing markets restrict competi-
tion as well as enhance efficiency Such ventures reduce the
number of competitors in the market because the partners will
refrain, in the natural course, from competing with their own af-
filiate.' The joint venture, in effect, will take the place of its
partners within the scope of its operations. Whether or not the
parties expressly agree not to compete with the joint venture,
they usually will avoid competition that could harm their own
affiliate.'44 For such ventures, a simple consideration of the
parties' competitive purpose is not sufficient; in addition, the
player's original team with one or more other players. The court concluded that such
a restrictive rule unduly deterred teams from bargaining with and signing free
agents. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620. However, the court also pointed out that certain
reasonable restrictions on player mobility were necessary in view of the NFL's
"strong and unique interest in maintaining competitive balance among its teams," Id.
at 621. Restrictions such as a salary "cap" for each team, limitations on the players
who may become "free agents," and rules governng the order in which professional
teams may "draft" amateur players should be upheld as reasonable means of main-
taming a competitive balance among all teams in the league. However, territorial
restrictions on the ability of teams to move from one location to another have no
bearing on competitive balance and should not be permitted. Such restraints simply
insulate individual teams from potential commercial rivalry, "in essence allowing
them to set monopoly prices to the detriment of the consuming public." Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1395 (9th
Cir.) (invalidating an NFL rule which prevented teams from moving into markets
already served by another team), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
143. A joint venture "reduces the parents' incentive for competition'because whatev-
er a parent might earn by making individual sales in the joint market is now offset
by its lowered profit as a partner in the joint venture." Brodley, supra note 131, at
76.
144. Id.
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courts must balance the "tradeoff between efficiency gains
and the potential anticompetitive losses."'45
A balancing approach is appropriate not only when a joint
venture restricts exsting competition among its partners but
also when it limits potential competition. Firms may form joint
ventures for the purpose of enhancing their efficiency in a new
market which one or more of the partners could have entered on
their own. Such a venture forecloses the partners' individual
entry into the relevant market. By virtue of the partners' partic-
ipation in the joint venture, other competitors will no longer
perceive them as potential entrants into the market. In making
their decisions on pricing and output, the incumbent competitors
will not feel constrained by the threat of individual entry by the
joint venture partners.4 ' Thus, the courts should balance the
efficiencies and anticompetitive effects of joint ventures that
cover areas in which their partners currently compete or, but for
the joint venture, would have competed.
The balancing test for such joint ventures can be undertaken
rather simply The net balance of efficiencies and anticompeti-
tive effects will be evident from extrinsic evidence. The degree of
integration achieved in the venture will reveal the amount of
efficiencies which the arrangement can generate. The potential
adverse effects will be evident from the scope and duration of
the venture and its relationship to the parties' downstream
production and marketing operations.
145. Thomas L. Greaney & Jody L. Sindelar, Physician-Sponsored Joint Ventures:
An Antitrust Analysis of Preferred Provider Organizations, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 571
(1987). One commentator has characterized the Federal Trade Commission's analysis
of the GM-Toyota joint venture as a balancing approach. See David A. Clanton,
Horizontal Agreements, the Rule of Reason and the General Motors-Toyota Joint Ven-
ture, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 1239 (1984). Such an approach was appropriate for this
partially integrated venture that covered an area, the production of compact cars, m
which the two companies already competed.
146. The Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Corp.,
378 U.S. 158 (1964) that such adverse consequences could result from a joint
venture's elimination of potential competition. Id. at 173-74; see also Yamaha Motor
Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding illegal a joint venture between a
domestic outboard motor manufacturer and a foreign manufacturer that probably
would have entered the U.S. market in the absence of the joint venture), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
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2. Integration as a Proxy for Efficiency
Antitrust practitioners and enforcement agencies have found
it difficult to assess the merits of efficiency claims. Indeed, this
difficulty has been one of the reasons for the courts' failure to
adopt a balancing approach for partially integrated joint ven-
tures.14' By using integration as a proxy for efficiency, the
courts can avoid this impediment to the adoption of a balancing
analysis.
A cooperative arrangement must be at least partially integrat-
ed in order to qualify for a full balancing approach under the
continuum of joint venture analysis.148 A broad range of con-
duct, however, can be classified as a partial integration, ranging
from mere agreements by competitors to pool their market pow-
er to substantial commitments by rivals to invest their resources
in new enterprises. The specific degree of integration agreed to
by the parties should be a reliable indicator of the potential
efficiencies that can be achieved by the venture. As one commen-
tator has pointed out, "the assumption that higher levels of
integration are likely to be associated with more substantial
efficiencies is a prense underlying all of antitrust."'49
The pro-competitive effects of a joint venture will be maxi-
nized when the parties integrate their resources to create a new
competitive entity with capabilities beyond those of the individu-
al partners. The amount of capital, technology, or other assets
contributed to a strategic alliance demonstrates the extent of the
147. As certain commentators have pointed out, "efficiencies are easy to allege,
hard to prove, and even harder to balance." Rule & Meyer, supra note 6, at 284
(footnote omitted). The Department of Justice has stated that it is difficult to prove
the extent of the efficiencies likely to result from a merger. See DOJ Merger Guide-
lines, supra note 6, at 20,574; see also Azcuenaga, supra note 123, at 941 (noting
that the identification and measurement of efficiencies is expensive and inexact).
Professor Areeda has concluded that "[t]he coming battle will be how to assess effi-
ciency claims." Phillip Areeda, A Second Century of the Rule of Reason, 59 ANTI-
TRusT L.J. 143, 148-49 (1990).
148. Under the continuum, unintegrated arrangements would be precluded on their
face, while fully integrated ventures would be analyzed under a merger-based mar-
ket power approach. See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
149. Pitofsky, supra note 130, at 1623. But see Greaney & Sindelar, supra note
145, at 523-24 n.37 (arguing that greater integration does not always lead to in-
creased efficiency).
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parties' commitment to achieve efficiencies through the joint
venture that they could not have achieved on their own. Re-
search and development joint ventures, for example, can achieve
technical breakthroughs when partners are willing to assign to
the venture all of their rights to relevant technology Production
joint ventures are most successful when the partners contribute
a significant amount of capital to construct efficient new facili-
ties. Conversely, when partners contribute few resources to joint
ventures or assume little of the risk of a venture's success or
failure, they are more likely to be acting for their own competi-
tive benefit than to enhance economic efficiency For example,
an agreement under which firms agree to coordinate their buy-
ing decisions may enhance the profitability of the participants.
However, if the parties do not share warehousing, ordering ser-
vices, or means of transportation, inventory may be no more
readily available to customers than if the parties had continued
to purchase supplies separately 10 Similarly, unintegrated
marketing joint ventures do little more than enhance the
parties' ability to coordinate their pricing decisions and raise
their profit margins. Without a combination of their partners'
distribution networks, marketing alliances cannot offer custom-
ers a broader product line or enhanced delivery or point-of-sale
services.1 51
150. In denying a per se approach in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacif-
ic Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), the Supreme Court pointed out
that the integrated purchasing cooperative at issue allowed "participating retailers to
achieve economies of scale in purchasing and warehousing that would otherwise be
unavailable to them." Id. at 286-87.
151. Four foreign airlines, for example, are attempting to join with airlines m the
United States to create "seamless international travel," which is the appearance,
from a traveler's perspective, that he or she is traveling on a single airline from
domestic to foreign destinations. Agis Salpukas, The Big Foreign Push to Buy into
U.S. Airlines, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1992, at F10. A rather complex integration of
operations between domestic and foreign carriers is necessary to create such an
appearance. Thus, under these arrangements, the airlines will coordinate route plan-
ning, ticket pricing, and maintenance, and will share the same identification num-
bers in computer reservation systems. Id.
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3. The Proxies for Anticompetitwe Effects
All joint ventures among current or potential rivals restrict
competition to some degree." 2 Under the balancing portion of
the continuum, the courts should be able to assess the specific
extent of such restriction from the duration and scope of a joint
venture and its relationship to the marketing phase of its
partners' operations.
The primary purpose of the Sherman Act is to prevent con-
spiracies among competitors that raise prices or restrict out-
put."' The potential for such conspiracies "grows as a company
moves closer to the marketplace." 4 Thus, the potential anti-
competitive effects of strategic alliances can be judged according
to their distance from the production and marketing stage. Joint
ventures designed for research and development, joint purchas-
ing, and other "inputs" into the production process have less of
an anticompetitive potential than downstream production or
marketing ventures.' 5
152. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
153. See BORK, supra note 141, at 17, 20-21; Alan Fisher et al., Price Effects of
Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REV. 777, 785-86 (1989). The Supreme Court conclud-
ed in BMI that a court's principal inquiry under § 1 of the Sherman Act should be
whether the restraint at issue "facially appears to be one that would always or al-
most always tend to restrict competition and decrease output." Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
154. Eisen, supra note 34, at 263.
155. Clanton, supra note 145, at 1243 ("The risk of collusion is greatest in output-
oriented ventures designed to jointly produce or distribute a product or service."); see
also Grady, supra note 95, at 770 ("an 'input' venture raises little risk of anti-
trust liability"); Kattan, supra note 45, at 946 ("Any joint venture that would restrict
the independent decision-making of its participants with respect to price or output
raises at least some of the competitive concerns that would be raised by a merger of
the participants."); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 873 ("When the venture starts making
hardware and moving merchandise, it enters those parts of the economy where the
nation has trusted competition most and been served by it best."). Research and de-
velopment joint ventures have been described as "pre-competitive" arrangements
because they do not affect downstream competition among their partners. See Chris-
topher Jensen, Big 3 Work Together On Research, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Feb.
28, 1993, at El. In commenting on the research consortia among the Big Three
automobile companies, which cover areas such as vehicle emissions, automobile safe-
ty features, and the development of an electric car, John P McTague, Ford's Vice-
President of Technical Affairs, stated, "The curious thing is that the three of us
working together frees up resources for competitive issues. It makes us better
able to compete with each other. That is the net result." Id.
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The anticompetitive effects of joint ventures also depend upon
their scope and duration. Strategic alliances which last for only
a short period of time or cover a small portion of their partners'
operations have a minimal anticompetitive potential. Ventures
of such small scope give the parties a broad latitude to continue
to compete with each other. As long as production joint ventures
do not extend into the marketing phase, the partners will retain
their incentive to compete with each other on pricing.' If the
venture covers only one part of a broad product line, the parties
may even use knowledge gained from the joint venture to com-
pete more aggressively in other lines."7 Joint ventures of short
duration have a minimal anticompetitive effect because their
partners are likely to be acutely aware that their self-interest
lies in maintaining their ability to compete effectively after the
venture terminates. The partners in such ventures tend to be
concerned not with limiting competition among themselves but
with securing a reasonable return on their investment by mak-
ing the venture as efficient as possible.' If, on the other hand,
a joint venture extends for an unlimited period, the partners will
share a long-term mutuality of interests. They are likely to be
less concerned about competing with each other and more in-
clined to consider explicit or tacit limitations on their competi-
tion.
4. Applying the Balancing Approach to Specific Joint
Ventures
The use of promes for both efficiencies and anticompetitive
effects will simplify the courts' balancing approach to joint ven-
tures which restrict rivalry among their partners. In most cases,
the outcome of the balancing analysis will be readily apparent
from the degree of integration achieved by the parties, the scope
156. If the partners purchase products from the joint venture for resale to their
customers, they also will have an incentive to operate the production joint venture
as efficiently as possible in order to insure the lowest possible supply price. See
Hypothetical B, supra note 54, at 1202 (comments of James F Rill).
157. Indeed, GM has used its joint venture with Toyota to learn Japanese manu-
facturing techniques that will make it a more efficient competitor against its domes-
tic and foreign rivals. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
158. See Hypothetical B, supra note 54, at 1206-07 (comments of A. Paul Victor).
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and duration of the venture, and its downstream or upstream
nature.
Well integrated, upstream ventures of limited scope and dura-
tion almost always should be upheld under the balancing test.
Such alliances have few anticompetitive effects and generate
significant efficiencies. For example, a research and development
joint venture to which the parties contribute substantial finan-
cial and technical resources is likely to lead to the production
and marketing of a new product. The venture may limit the
number and variety of competing technical paths taken to de-
velop the product, but it will not prevent the parties from com-
peting at the production and marketing stages. With such a
clear beneficial effect and limited adverse impact, a well-inte-
grated research and development venture should not be deemed
illegal under the antitrust laws.
If a production joint venture is well-integrated and of limited
scope and duration, it, too, should survive the balancing test
rather easily Such ventures usually result in significant effi-
ciencies and have only limited anticompetitive effects. The Gen-
eral Motors-Toyota joint venture, for example, only covers the
production of a single small car model. Because it permits the
parties to continue to compete in the manufacture and sale of all
other automobiles, it does not unduly limit competition in the
domestic automobile market. At the same time, the substantial
integration achieved in the venture has allowed personnel of
General Motors and Toyota to work closely together to develop
more efficient methods of manufacturing a small car. In uphold-
ing the venture, the Federal Trade Commission recognized that
the adverse competitive impact of an arrangement of such nar-
row scope would be outweighed by its efficiency enhancing po-
tential.
Some upstream joint ventures are so far removed from the
production and marketing stages that they are incapable of
causing sigmficant anticompetitive effects. Thus they can be up-
159. See J. Fred Weston & Stanley I. Ornstem, Efficiency Considerations in Joint
Ventures, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 85, 91 (1984); Hypothetical B, supra note 54, at 1198
(comments of David Clanton); Lynn E. Eccleston, Note, Antitrust Implications of a
Joint Venture: Is an Efficiencies Justification Justifiable?, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1219,
1219-20 (1985).
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held even in cases in which they are not substantially integrat-
ed. Purchasing cooperatives, for example, are not likely to in-
crease the price or limit the availability of consumer end prod-
ucts. Indeed, if they affect the production and marketing stages
at all, they are more likely to lower prices and increase output
by reducing purchasers' costs. Buying cooperatives with no more
integration than a combining of their members' purchasing oper-
ations therefore should be upheld in most cases.
On the other hand, downstream marketing joint ventures that
are not substantially integrated usually should be precluded
under a balancing approach. Such ventures limit competition in
the critical areas of pricing and output.6 ' In the absence of
substantial integration, marketing joint ventures also create few
efficiencies. Indeed, without a combination of the partners' mar-
keting resources, the only "efficiency" resulting from a pooling of
marketing power in a joint venture will be enhanced profits for
the participants. Thus, if a marketing joint venture is not well
integrated, it usually will be clear that the anticompetitive ef-
fects of such a downstream collaboration outweigh its efficien-
cies.
The efficiencies and potential anticompetitive effects of certain
other types of joint ventures may be balanced more evenly Pro-
duction joint ventures of broad scope and well integrated mar-
keting joint ventures, for example, have the capability both to
generate significant efficiencies and to substantially limit compe-
tition. When no clear choice exists between the potential benefi-
cial and adverse effects of a joint venture, the courts should give
the benefit of the doubt to ventures conceived in good faith.'6 '
The parties' private solutions to the challenge of enhancing their
160. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
161. Professor Areeda has stated, "[wihen courts find that both detriment and re-
deeming virtue are present in more-or-less significant degree, I predict that the
redeeming virtue will come increasingly to trump the detriment." Areeda, supra note
147, at 149. The Federal Trade Commission's "structured" rule of reason, however,
does not make the parties' beneficial purpose the critical factor in the analysis: "a
valid efficiency justification is not an affirmative defense but only a potential coun-
terbalance to any anti-competitive effect " Kevin J. Arquit & Joseph Kattan,
Efficiency Considerations and Horizontal Restraints, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 717, 721
(1991).
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efficiency usually will be preferable to the alternatives that the
courts could devise.
Production joint ventures that extend for a long period of time
are likely to reduce the total manufacturing capacity in the
relevant market. This limitation of output may result in price
increases in the marketing phase. However, if the parties have a
valid efficiency objective for such a venture, the courts should
give that objective significant weight in the balancing test. A
production joint venture of broad scope, for example, may be the
only means by which firms in certain markets can afford to
replace obsolete facilities. Basic industries such as steel, alumi-
num, rubber, and automobiles currently are experiencing signifi-
cant worldwide excess capacity 2 Individual firms in such in-
dustries may be unable to absorb the costs of employee sever-
ance, pension plan terminations, environmental cleanup, and
other liabilities that arise when old manufacturing facilities are
closed. Joint ventures give firms the ability to generate the capi-
tal required to replace outdated plants with new facilities which
can produce higher quality products at lower prices.6 3 Such
162. In the tire industry, "15 to 20 percent of the worldwide tiremaking capacity
needs to be shut' down before supply and demand come into line." Jonathan P
Hicks, Chasing Few Buyers with Too Many Tires, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1991, at F5.
In the automobile industry, worldwide excess production capacity totals 8.2 million
cars and trucks a year, which is enough capacity for 33 assembly plants (more than
General Motors has in all of North America). Krystal Miller et al., Auto Industry Is
Hit by a Global Shakeout, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1992, at Al.
163. Joint ventures in industries suffering from overcapacity may allow American
companies "to close weak facilities, invest in strong ones, and keep produc-
tion alive in the United States." Ira Millstem, The Impact of the Antitrust Laws on
America's Ability to Restructure Its Industries and Proposals for Change, 47 U. PITT.
L. REV. 713, 722 (1986). Joint ventures that combine production facilities but leave
their partners free to market products separately would be preferable to the large
mergers that occurred in basic American industries in the 1980's. See Hicks, supra
note 162, at F5. Some service industries also are experiencing overcapacity, and joint
ventures could lead to more efficient operations in such markets. For example,
"[plounded by overcapacity the airline industry has sustained $8 billion in losses
since 1990." Bridget O'Brian, Tired of Airline Losses, AMR Pushes Its Bid to Diversi-
fy Business, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1993, at Al. Joint ventures would allow airlines
to eliminate costs, rationalize routes, finance the purchase of more fuel efficient
aircraft, and provide better customer service. Responding to calls from some politi-
cians and airline executives for increased regulation of the industry, Transportation
Secretary Federico Pena has appointed a commission to study ways of aiding the
airline industry. Id. A more permissive antitrust approach to joint ventures among
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efficiencies should be given at least as much weight in the
courts' balancing analysis as the short-term reduction in compe-
tition caused by the venture.
The efficiencies and anticompetitive effects of well-integrated
marketing joint ventures may be just as closely balanced. Joint
ventures at this sensitive downstream stage have a significant
potential to restrict competition. But the partners to a market-
ing joint venture may integrate their resources in a way that
significantly benefits consumers. For example, a marketing joint
venture among consumer products companies, by combining its
partners' disparate sales forces, may be able to provide custom-
ers with better advertising, a broader range of products, en-
hanced product explanations and warranties, and more effective
delivery services. The efficiencies which result from these inte-
grated marketing joint ventures should be considered at least as
significant as any of their anticompetitive effects.
VII. ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS
Once a court determines the legality of a joint venture, it
should consider the appropriateness of any ancillary restrictions
on competition agreed to by the parties. Judge Taft's 1898 deci-
sion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co."M sets forth
an effective test for the legality of ancillary restraints. Under
Judge Tafts approach, the parties' purpose for a joint venture
would determine whether a particular ancillary restraint on
competition is permitted."6 5 The courts would uphold any re-
straint that is "reasonably necessary" to accomplish the legiti-
mate purposes of a cooperative arrangement; restraints that are
broader than required to effectuate such purposes would be void."
airlines would permit a free market, rather than a governmental, solution to the
industry's overcapacity problem.
164. 85 F 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd as modified by 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
165. Judge Taft stated that the purpose of a particular transaction "suggests the
measure of protection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by which
the validity of such restraints may be judicially determined." Id. at 282.
166. Id. at 281. Judge Bork recently interpreted Judge Tafts ancillary restraints
analysis in a similar manner:
To be ancillary, and hence exempt from the per se rule, an agreement
eliminating competition must be subordinate and collateral to a separate,
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A. Membership Rules
Membership rules may limit competition by denying particu-
lar firms access to a joint venture that could enhance their effi-
ciency in the relevant market. Such rules, however, usually
should be upheld as ancillary to a joint venture. Most coopera-
tive arrangements among competitors could not operate effec-
tively without membership restrictions."' A joint venture could
become unwieldy if open access by all interested parties was
required. Joint venture partners also have a reasonable interest
in ensuring that all participants can make a meaningful contri-
bution to the venture. Rules setting forth minimum financial
capabilities, technical qualifications, or academic or professional
certifications for joint venture partners therefore should be up-
held.
In certain cases, membership restrictions for joint ventures
actually may promote competition in the relevant market. If a
joint venture is not all-inclusive, the firms denied membership
will be more likely to pursue an independent course in competi-
tion with the venture.' Firms that cannot access a research
legitimate transaction. The ancillary restraint is subordinate and collater-
al in the sense that it serves to make the main transaction more effec-
tive in accomplishing its purpose. Of course, the restraint imposed must
be related to the efficiency sought to be achieved. If it is so broad that
part of the restraint suppresses competition without creating efficiency,
the restraint is, to that extent, not ancillary.
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. dented, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987). The Department of Justice has adopted
essentially the same test for ancillary restraints: "The legality of collateral restraints
is largely a function of the proximity of their relationship to the essential purposes
of the joint research venture " United States Department of Justice Antitrust
Guidelines Concerning Research Joint Ventures, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) %1 3,120,
at 20,656 (1988).
167. Thus the Supreme Court recognized in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), that membership restrictions
should be upheld when they are "substantially related to the efficiency-enhancing or
procompetitive purposes that otherwise justify the [venture's] practices." Id. at 296
n.7.
168. In SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A. Inc., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 70,217 (D.
Utah 1993), the court pointed out in dicta that it would have been preferable, from
a competitive standpoint, for the Visa credit card system to have precluded Sears
from membership, because Sears then would have been forced to continue marketing
its own credit card in competition with Visa. Id. at 70,041.
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and development venture, for example, may form competing
ventures of their own, or they may decide to pursue development
of the new technology independently
Courts should not allow membership limitations, however,
when a joint venture controls an "essential facility" necessary to
compete in the relevant market. Firms may not be able to manu-
facture or market a particular product without access to certain
raw materials, information, technology, or means of production,
and in order to compete in a particular industry, firms may need
to become members of standards-setting organizations (such as
stock exchanges or professional associations) which establish the
rules of conduct for that industry 169 When a joint venture con-
trols such critical assets or services, its partners should not be
allowed to preclude participation by third parties arbitrarily
Denial of a competitor's access to the joint venture in these cir-
cumstances would have the same effect as excluding it from the
relevant market.7
B. Restraints Affecting Competitin Among Joint Venture
Partners
Overly broad ancillary restraints can destroy a joint venture's
most beneficial characteristic: its ability to promote efficiency
while allowing its partners to continue to compete in other ar-
eas. Certain restraints ancillary to a joint venture may unduly
restrict competition among the partners. "Spillover" effects in
169. The courts thus have required open membership rules for ventures which con-
trol such essential facilities or services. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373
U.S. 341 (1963) (stock exchange); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light &
Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (industry standards-setting organization); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (worldwide news-gathering service); United
States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (unified railroad terminal sys-
tem); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th
Cir.) (control of interconnection between long distance and local telephone service),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d
1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (multiple listing service for real estate).
170. The joint venture, however, should be permitted to establish reasonable qualifi-
cations (such as mimmum financial and technical capabilities) and to charge reason-
able membership fees. See National Inst. on Joint Ventures, Questions and Answers
to Overview: A Basic Foundation for Joint Venture Analysts, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 947,
948 (1985) (comments of Richard W Pogue).
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areas outside a joint venture's scope may result from partners'
agreements to exchange competitive information, to fix the pric-
es at which they can sell the products of a joint venture, or to
establish the customers or territories to which particular part-
ners can sell.
1. Information Exchange
Exchanges of confidential technical, production, and market-
ing information between the partners of a joint venture are often
necessary for the effective operation of the venture. Research
and development joint ventures could not operate without a free
flow of techmcal information between partners. Production joint
ventures may require data from their partners on manufactur-
ing methods, raw material costs, capacity, and production sched-
ules. Joint sales organizations necessitate the exchange of pric-
ing and marketing information.
Courts, however, should prohibit the exchange of sensitive
competitive information with uses beyond the specific objectives
of a joint venture. It would be inappropriate, for example, for the
partners in research and development or production joint ven-
tures to disclose marketing information to each other.' Such
information could be used by the parties improperly to coordi-
nate their decisions on pricing and output. In order to avoid
inappropriate exchanges of information, sales or marketing per-
sonnel of the partners should be excluded from participating in
research and development or production joint ventures.'72 Even
171. Section 2(b)(1) of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 excludes from
the Act's coverage the exchange of any information "that is not reasonably required
to conduct the research and development that is the purpose of such venture." Na-
tional Cooperative Research Act § 2(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 4301(b)(1) (1988). As a condi-
tion of approving the General Motors-Toyota joint venture, the Federal Trade Com-
mission required detailed ongoing reporting requirements on the information to be
exchanged by the parties. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 385 (1984) (consent
order). Similarly, the consent decree for an aluminum production joint venture be-
tween Alcan and Arco prohibited the parties from exchanging information on custom-
ers, terms or conditions of sale, or marketing plans. United States v. Alcan Alumi-
num Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 621 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
172. The Arco-Alcan consent decree required that the joint venture manufacturing
company not include marketing employees of Alcan, with which the joint venture
would be competing. Id. at 625.
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in a joint marketing organization, exchanges of pricing informa-
tion should be limited to the specific products covered by the
venture.
2. Price Fixing
The legality of a price-fixing agreement among joint venture
partners depends upon how integral the arrangement is to the
operation of the venture. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,"'
the Supreme Court refused to apply the per se rule to the price-
fixing arrangement among the musical composers because it was
an essential element of the blanket license, without which the
product could not have been offered. 74 The establishment of
uniform fees for the physicians who are members of a health
maintenance organization (HMO) may be no less critical to such
an organization's ability to market its health care services to
cost-conscious consumers. It also has been argued that HMOs
should be able to establish uniform charges for member physi-
cians in order to prevent high-priced doctors from free riding on
their more efficient colleagues."'5 However, price-fixing ar-
rangements that are not necessary for the attainment of the
legitimate objectives of a joint venture should be struck down on
their face."' Agreements by the members of a production joint
173. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
174. Id. at 20-23. Similarly, in National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779
F.2d 592 (iith Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986), a national credit card venture
established the fee to be paid to the card issuer's bank for processing credit transac-
tions. The court concluded that a uniform fee was necessary because "individual
price negotiations are impractical, would produce instability and higher fees, and
could result in the demise of the product offered." Id. at 605.
175. See Arquit & Kattan, supra note 161, at 725. Others have argued, however,
that HMOs can achieve the same result in a less restrictive fashion by granting
price-setting authority to a third party or by having separate pricing agreements
between each physician and the HMO. See, e.g., Horoschak, supra note 111, at 17;
see also Remarks of Terry Calvani, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, reported
at 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 50,479, at 56,283 (Feb. 20, 1986) ("The FTC is inter-
ested in assuring that ventures do not serve as a vehicle for price fixing among the
participating doctors.").
176. In the NCAA case, for example, the Supreme Court summarily condemned
restrictions on price competition in the sale of television rights for college football
games because the restrictions were not necessary to insure the quality of collegiate
athletics. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117-20 (1984).
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venture on the prices at which the products of the venture are to
be marketed, for example, exceed the legitimate scope of the
venture and should be summarily condemned."'
3. Terntorial or Customer Restraints
Restrictions on the territories in which joint venture partners
may market a product or the customers to whom they may sell
are even more anticompetitive than price-fixng agreements.
Such territorial and customer restraints often amount to agree-
ments by the partners to avoid all competition with each other.
When the partners to a joint venture agree to market a product
at a particular price, they can at least continue to compete with
each other in non-price areas such as customer service. When
joint venture partners agree to sell only in different territories
or to separate customers, however, all competition between the
parties, whether price or non-price, will be eliminated.' 8
In one circumstance, however, territorial or customer restric-
tions do not have such a severe adverse effect: when they limit
competition that exists only as a consequence of a joint venture.
Such restrictions have no incremental adverse effect in the case
of a joint venture that makes possible the production of a new
product or entry into a new market. Territorial and customer
restrictions may be necessary to induce firms to invest in such
risky ventures.' 9 Under such circumstances, noncompetition
177. An agreement by the partners not to sell their own competitive products at
prices lower than those for the products of the joint venture should be no less ille-
gal. See Roberts, supra note 141, at 141.
178. The courts consistently have found horizontal market division agreements to
be per se illegal because of their severe anticompetitive effects. See, e.g., Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951) (allocation of tern-
tones among affiliated companies in Europe); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622
F.2d 1068, 1072 (2d Cir. 1980) (agreement to allocate territories for dictation ma-
chines); United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1087-90 (5th
Cir.) (competitors' agreement not to solicit others' accounts), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
903 (1978); United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 357 F.2d 806, 807
(3d Cir.) (allocation among refuse pick-up customers), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961
(1966).
179. For example, firms may not be willing to participate in a research and devel-
opment joint venture in a high barrier market without being guaranteed an exclu-
sive license of joint venture technology in a particular territory. Partners in market-
ing joint ventures for new products may require a guarantee of an exclusive right to
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agreements among partners have no real anticompetitive effect
because, in their absence, the relevant product would not have
been available in any event."'
It is, however, hard to conceive of a circumstance in which
territorial or customer restraints would be necessary to induce
firms to invest in joint ventures for the production or marketing
of existing products. Joint ventures in existing markets are
substantially less risky than ventures designed to produce new
products. Less restrictive alternatives than customer or territo-
rial restrictions should be sufficient to induce investments in
ventures in current markets. The partners should not have to
eliminate all competition between themselves in order to make
their joint venture viable. For example, instead of absolutely
prohibiting its partners from selling in other partners' territo-
ries, a joint venture may require the partners to concentrate
their sales efforts in their own areas of primary responsibili-
ty 181 The partners also could be required to pay a fee for sales
made outside of their areas of primary responsibility The fee
could be calculated to compensate the other partners for the
costs of investing in the joint venture or providing desired ser-
vices to customers in their own areas. Because less restrictive
alternatives such as these are available, the courts should pro-
hibit territorial allocations among the partners to production or
marketing joint ventures that operate in existing markets.'82
sell the products in a particular territory or to certain customers. Exclusive terr-
torial grants, however, should extend only for the period necessary to assure the
partners that they can recoup their original investment and receive a reasonable
return to compensate them for their up-front risks.
180. As one commentator has stated, "If the venture and the restraints together
made the new competition possible, then, but for the restraints, the parties would
have nothing to restrain." Martin B. Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures
and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and
Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L. REV. 879, 911 n.208 (1980).
181. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 414 U.S. 801
(1973) (mem.), affirmed the district court's decision which had allowed areas of pri-
mary responsibility and profit pass-over clauses as less restrictive alternatives to the
exclusive territories which the Court had originally prohibited. See United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F Supp. 1031, 1043 (1970), affd mem., 414 U.S. 801 (1973).
182. The courts generally have prohibited such ancillary restrictions. In its only
decisions dealing with horizontal market division among joint venture partners, the
Supreme Court has applied the per se rule. In United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S.
350 (1967), and United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), the
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C. Agreements Not to Compete with the Jotnt Venture Itself
Joint venture partners have a legitimate interest in ensuring
that all parties refrain from harming the venture by competing
within its scope of operations. Unlike participating firms'
agreements not to compete with each other, partners' agree-
ments not to compete with the joint venture itself have few
anticompetitive effects and usually should be upheld. Agree-
ments by partners not to compete with each other are horizontal
combinations which eliminate all actual or potential competition
among the participants in the relevant market. Agreements by
partners not to compete with their own joint venture, however,
are vertical and only limit competition within the venture's
sphere of activities." 3 Furthermore, such agreements do not
Court failed to find any legitimate rationale for the establishment of exclusive sales
territories for joint venture partners. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 611; Sealy, 388 U.S.
at 356-57. Some lower federal courts and commentators believe that the Supreme
Court has overruled Sealy and Topco implicitly by its recent application of the rule
of reason to horizontal restraints incidental to joint ventures. See Rothery Storage &
Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Clucago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Bas-
ketball Ass'n, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affd, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.
Ill.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992); Clanton, supra note 145, at 1245 n.30;
Charles F Rule, The Administration's View on Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J.
1121, 1123 (1985). However, the Supreme Court and the enforcement agencies con-
tinue to cite Topco with favor. See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-
50 (1990) (per curam); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
734 (1988); see also J.P McGrath, Text of Remarks Prepared for Delivery Before the
18th Annual New England Antitrust Conference, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,470,
at 56,138 (Nov. 12, 1984). In fact, in Palmer the Court expressly reaffirmed the per
se illegality of a horizontal market division among competitors. Palmer, 498 U.S. at
49-50. Some recent lower federal court cases also have cited Topco for the per se
illegality of horizontal market allocation. See, e.g., United States v. Capitol Serv.,
Inc., 568 F Supp. 134, 154 (E.D. Wis. 1983), affd, 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 945 (1985). Indeed, most lower federal courts have deemed illegal
any grant of exclusive marketing territories to joint venture partners. See Yamaha
Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981) (invalidating division of territories
between United States and export markets for outboard motors), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 915 (1982); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1979) (division of territories between North American and foreign markets for motor-
cycles), rehg granted, 615 F.2d 575 (ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983, and
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Compact v. Metropolitan Gov't, 594 F Supp. 1567,
1576 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (elimination of competitive bidding for government contracts
between members of joint venture).
183. In antitrust parlance, agreements among competitors are referred to as "hon-
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limit any competition that otherwise would exist. The elinnna-
tion of competition between a joint venture and its partners is a
natural consequence of a joint venture's formation. Direct com-
petition with a joint venture is contrary to the partners' inter-
ests because it reduces the profits of their own affiliate." 4 Re-
gardless of whether they have entered into an express
noncompetition agreement, the partners to a joint venture will
avoid competing with their own joint venture because it is in
their interest to do so. Noncompetition agreements between
partners and their own joint venture therefore should be upheld
because they do not extend competitive restrictions beyond the
natural scope of the venture."8 5
zontal," while agreements between a supplier and its customers are termed "verti-
cal." See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984). The courts gener-
ally have treated horizontal agreements more severely than vertical agreements
because they have more serious anticompetitive effects. See Thomas A. Piramo, Jr.,
Sharp Dealing: The Horizontal/Vertical Dichotomy in Distributor Termination Cases,
38 EMORY L.J. 311, 344-51 (1989); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Reformed Antitrust Ap-
proach to Distributor Terminations, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 281-85 (1992).
184. The Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Corp.,
378 U.S. 158 (1964), that "[r]ealistically, the parents would not compete with their
progeny." Id. at 168.
185. Judge Taft held in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F 271
(6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), that noncompetition agreements should be
upheld as ancillary restraints because they are made "with a view of securing [each
partner's] entire effort in the common enterprise." Id. at 280. Many courts and com-
mentators have concluded that agreements by partners not to compete with their
own joint venture should be upheld as ancillary restraints. See, e.g., Rothery Storage
& Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding local
carrier agents' agreement not to compete with national moving company); Louis,
supra note 180, at 902-03. The Department of Justice and some courts, however,
continue to believe that agreements by parties not to compete with their joint ven-
tures are illegal. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas
Elec. Light & Power Co., 97 F Supp. 952, 955-56 (D. Md. 1951) (invalidating an
agreement precluding competition between the parents and the joint venture in elec-
trical generation market), affd, 194 F.2d 89 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 963
(1952); U.S. Department of Justice Guidelines for Research Joint Ventures-1980, 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,120, at 20,656 (Nov. 1980) ("An agreement by the par-
ticipants to forego independent research in competition with the joint venture may
constitute an unreasonable competitive restraint.").
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VIII. APPLYING THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS TO HEALTH CARE
REFORM
The continuum-based approach proposed in this Article would
facilitate the courts' analysis of the new types of cooperative ar-
rangements likely to be formed in the health care industry in
the next few years. The concept of "managed competition" has
now been embraced as a means of health care reform by the
Clinton Adnmstration.1 8 ' First enunciated by Professor A.C.
Enthoven in 1988,"87 this approach proposes the creation of
purchasing groups with enough bargaimng power to convince
hospitals and physicians to provide more cost-effective servic-
es. 8 Under the Clinton Administration's health care reform
plan, each state must establish at least one regional health
alliance that will be responsible for providing health care cover-
age to all residents of that state.189 By joining the purchasing
cooperatives, small employers and individuals could acquire the
same leverage over providers as larger health care purchasers.
The increased purchasing clout of the health care alliances
should foster greater competition among health care providers,
thereby restraimng prices and enhancing the quality of care. In
response to the demands of the new purchasing cooperatives,
hospitals and physicians are expected to merge, form HMOs,
and affiliate with each other in a variety of alliances designed to
deliver more efficient health care. The antitrust issues raised by
such collaboration among consumers at the purchasing level and
health care providers at the supplier level can be resolved most
effectively under a continuum-based analysis.
186. See Pear, supra note 26, at A9; Steinmetz, supra note 26, at Al, All.
187. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MANAGED COMPETITION IN
HEALTH CARE FINANCE (1988). Over the past three years a group of academics,
executives, and physicians (known as the "Jackson Hole Group") has promoted the
concept. See Robin Toner, Hillary Clinton's Potent Brain Trust on Health Reform,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, § 3, at 1; The Answer: Managed Competition for
America's Health, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at A22.
188. ENTHOVEN, supra note 187, at 82.
189. See Excerpts from Final Draft of Health Care Overhaul Proposal, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1993, at A8.
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A. Health Care Purchasing Cooperatives
In many sections of the country, purchasing alliances among
health care consumers already have succeeded in lowering the
cost of health care.19° In Cleveland, the Council of Smaller En-
terprses, winch negotiates coverage for 175,000 employees and
dependents in more than 10,000 companies, limited total premi-
um increases over a five-year period to only thirty-five percent,
while health care premiums in Cleveland soared 150% during
the same period."' Purchasing alliances in Califorma have
reduced health care expenditures by more than $1 billion during
the last decade.192 In Minnesota, purchasing cooperatives have
introduced the discipline of competition to the local health care
community, which "in a blitz of mergers and alliances, is hus-
tling to recast its jumble of independent doctors and hospitals
into streamlined networks that compete much as Ford battles
Toyota: on price, service and quality "'
Most health care purchasing alliances should be upheld easily
under the continuum of joint venture analysis, even when they
include direct competitors. As partial integrations among com-
petitors, such alliances would fall within the section of the con-
tinuum requiring a balancing analysis. Such balancing could be
undertaken quite simply As upstream ventures far removed
from the production and marketing stages, health care purchas-
ing alliances can have only minimal anticompetitive effects. At
190. The cooperatives have been able to reduce costs not only through their en-
hanced consumer clout but also by avoiding duplication of administrative effort.
Doctors and hospitals, for example, have reduced their paperwork burden by submit-
ting standardized claims forms to regional purchasing alliances. See John J. Polk,
Health Care Reform Isn't Just Theory, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, § 3, at 11.
191. Id. The Cleveland Council's administrative charges also average only 12% of
premiums, as compared to 40% for small health insurers. Id.
192. Glenn Melnick, Managed Competition Works, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1993,
at A14.
193. Ron Winslow, Employers' Attack on Health Costs Spurs Change in Minnesota,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1993, at Ai. Anticipating the advent of managed competition,
health care providers in many sections of the country already have formed alliances
to compete for the business of large health care purchasers. This trend is expected
to accelerate within the next few years, as hundreds of hospitals become unable to
go it alone under a more competitive health care system. See Milt Freudenheim,
Hospitals Begin Streamlining for a New World in Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
1993, § 3, at 12.
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the same time, such ventures have a great potential to help
consumers. By combining the health care purchasing power of
individuals, small businesses, and larger employers, the coopera-
tives can induce suppliers to offer higher quality medical servic-
es at lower prices. The market power of purchasing alliances
may be sufficient to convince doctors and hospitals to offer fixed
fees for all health care required by an individual during a partic-
ular period of time.9 Many consumers would prefer such ar-
rangements to the traditional fee-for-service approach. In light
of their significant pro-competitive potential and minimal
anticompetitive effects, health care purchasing alliances should
not require a significant amount of integration in order to sur-
vive the balancing test. Such ventures should be upheld whenev-
er health care consumers have combined their purchasing opera-
tions for the legitimate purpose of extracting a more efficient
delivery of services from health care providers. 9 ' Thus, a con-
tinuum-based judicial approach would obviate the need for new
legislation to protect health care purchasing alliances from anti-
trust attack.
While the formation of health care purchasing alliances usual-
ly should not pose an antitrust problem, such alliances could
engage in ancillary restraints which violate the antitrust laws.
Membership in a regional health care purchasing cooperative,
for example, is likely to be critical to the competitiveness of
firms in the relevant area. A purchasing cooperative therefore
should not be permitted to deny membership to any interested
firms. ' It is reasonable to require such open access because
additional members are likely to add little to the administrative
194. In anticipation of the purchasing clout of the new health care alliances, doc-
tors and hospitals in several areas of the country have already begun to form net-
works to provide such services. See Pear, supra note 28, at A7.
195. Thus, any integration beyond a simple coordination of buying policies should
suffice to prove the legality of a health care purchasing alliance. As Kevin Arquit, a
former Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, put it, "the prudent antitrust
policy in most [health care] buying group situations is 'don't do something, just
stand there.' " Grady, supra note 95, at 770.
196. Regional health care purchasing cooperatives may be deemed by the courts to
be "essential facilities" to which access cannot be denied. See supra note 170 and
accompanying text.
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costs of a health care purchasing cooperative and, indeed, may
enhance its buying power.
It would be inappropriate for health care purchasing alliances
to permit the exchange among their members of market infor-
mation which could be used for anticompetitive purposes unre-
lated to the objectives of the alliance. The members, for example,
should have no need to disclose to each other any information on
pricing, customers, or production and sales costs. A purchasing
cooperative can fulfill its purpose of negotiating more favorable
health care coverage without access to such sensitive competitive
information.
By their nature, health care purchasing cooperatives will be
able to exert substantial market power. A health care purchas-
ing cooperative should not be able to use its market power for
anticompetitive purposes. Efforts by a health care purchasing
alliance to induce hospitals or physicians not to deal with an-
other alliance should be found illegal on their face under tradi-
tional group boycott theories.19 ' Some rural areas may have
only a single health care purchasing alliance.'98 In such areas,
the alliances will possess monopoly power. Health care purchas-
ing alliances with monopoly power may have a duty to deal with
all potential providers of health care within their region.'99
Such alliances should be precluded from using their market
power to push prices so low as to exclude particular providers
from the marketplace."'
B. Networks of Health Care Prowders
As downstream joint ventures, health care provider networks
raise more serious antitrust issues than do health care purchas-
197. See Hilary Stout, Proposal for Health-Care Cooperatives Draws Criticism as
Some See Growing Regulator Role, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1993, at A12.
198. The Clinton Administration's health care reform plan only requires each state
to establish a single health care purchasing alliance (although the states can estab-
lish additional alliances if they desire). See Excerpts from Final Draft of Health Care
Overhaul Proposal, supra note 189, at A8.
199. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
(imposing duty on monopolist to deal with competitor).
200. See Experts Ponder Potential for Monopsony by Health Alliances Under Reform
Plan, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1613, at 532-33 (May 6, 1993).
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ing alliances. Collective activities by hospitals or physicians
have the potential to affect pricing and output in a manner det-
rimental to consumers. Beginning in the late 1970's, for exam-
ple, HMOs were established in the health care market. By re-
placing the traditional fee-for-service with a fixed fee approach,
these orgamzations represented one of the best methods yet
conceived for reducing health care costs.2' Through various
collective activities, such as the promulgation of "ethical rules"
forbidding doctors from doing business with the HMOs, physi-
cians nearly were able to block the development of these new
orgamzatons. °2 Vigorous antitrust enforcement in the late
1970's and early 1980's protected HMOs from such collusive
boycotts.203
Because of their significant potential for anticompetitive ef-
fects, collective activities by health care providers should be
subject to rigorous antitrust scrutiny Under the continuum of
joint venture analysis, certain unintegrated ventures among
health care providers would be deemed illegal on their face. In
the absence of real integration, the continuum would preclude
any collective efforts by health care providers to negotiate prices
or other terms of dealing with health care purchasing allianc-
es.204 As the Supreme Court recogrnzed in Arizona v. Maricopa
201. See George Anders, Regulators Aim at Fees Doctors Charge HMOs, WALL ST.
J., May 14, 1993, at Bi; Flynn, supra note 21, at 24, Under an HMO, health insur-
ers pay a uniform annual or monthly sum, or capitation, for each member. This
approach gives doctors and hospitals a financial interest in avoiding unnecessary
tests and procedures. See Freudenhein, supra note 193, § 3, at 12.
202. See Flynn, supra note 21, at 24.
Z03. Senator Metzenbaum recently stated in a Senate hearing on health care re-
form, "if it had not been for vigorous antitrust enforcement, health care reform
might not even be possible." Witnesses Try to Convince Subcommittee Antitrust Is no
Barrier to Health Reform, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1614, at 574
(May 13, 1993).
204. As an aide to Senator Metzenbaum recently stated, "Providers should not be
able to contract collectively. It would turn on its head a lot of antitrust law. If man-
aged competition is going to work, you have to have competition." Experts Ponder
Potential for Monopsony by Health Alliances Under Reform Plan, 64 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1613, at 533 (May 6, 1993). The Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission recently issued guidelines for antitrust enforcement
activities against health care providers. Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health Care Area, 64
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1631 (Spec. Supp.) [hereinafter Federal
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County Medical Society ° and FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists,2"' such naked alliances among physicians have no le-
gitimate efficiency rationale. °7 Unless health care providers
have integrated their operations in an attempt to generate effi-
ciencies, there is no justification for permitting them to ally for
the purpose of countering the market power of health care pur-
chasing alliances."0 8
Not all alliances among health care providers, however,
should be precluded. In certain ventures providers may achieve
sufficient integration to overcome the anticompetitive potential
of the venture. By combining certain administrative functions,
for example, hospitals and physicians can achieve cost-savings
which can be passed along to consumers. By pooling their servic-
es in a health care network, physicians, hospitals, and insurers
can provide consumers with a guarantee of complete medical
care in exchange for a fixed fee.
Identifying the kinds of cooperative ventures among providers
that should pass antitrust muster will be one of the most critical
issues under the Clinton Administration's health care reform
program." 9 Little guidance has been available to health care
providers on the standards by which their cooperative ventures
will be judged, and this uncertainty has deterred them from
developing more efficient means of delivering health care ser-
vices to consumers.210
Health Care Guidelines]. The Federal Health Care Guidelines provide an "antitrust
safety zone" for certain joint ventures among health care providers. Unintegrated
joint ventures would not quality for the safety zone. Id. at S-15.
205. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
206. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
207. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
208. Health care providers currently are lobbying for a federal antitrust exemption
that would permit them to form unintegrated organizations that could bargain with
health care purchasing alliances. See Anders, supra note 201, at B1. Five states,
Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin, have passed laws exempting
health care providers from antitrust laws, and similar legislation is pending in six
other states. Felsenthal, supra note 22, at B1. The Federal Health Care Guidelines,
however, do not provide such an exemption, stating that unintegrated ventures
among health care providers should not qualify for an "antitrust safety zone." See
Federal Health Care Guidelines, supra note 204, at S-15.
209. See Flynn, supra note 21, at 39.
210. See Anders, supra note 201, at Bi; Robert J. Enders, An Introduction to Spe-
cial Antitrust Issues in Health Care Provider Joint Ventures, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 805,
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The continuum-based approach described in this Article would
give the courts a simple and effective standard by which to judge
the legality of cooperative ventures among health care providers.
When hospitals combine all of their operations in a single entity,
the transaction would fall within the merger-based portion of
the continuum. A complete analysis of the parties' purpose for
the transaction, any efficiencies resulting from the arrangement,
and the parties' market power would be appropriate in such a
case. A more truncated inquiry, however, would be appropriate
for partial integrations among competing health care providers.
Under the continuum, the legality of such arrangements could
be determined without a complete market analysis. The courts
simply would consider whether the providers had a legitimate
purpose for their cooperative arrangement and whether the effi-
ciencies likely to result from the arrangement outweighed its
potential anticompetitive effects.
The degree of integration achieved in any joint venture among
health care providers would be decisive in the balancing analy-
sis. In order for their conduct to be analyzed as a legitimate
joint venture rather than as a cartel, physicians and hospitals
would have to do more than simply coordinate- their parallel
activities. They would be required to combine previously sepa-
rate functions in a manner that produced efficiencies for the
benefit of health care consumers. Once the courts confirm the
existence of such integration, they could determine easily wheth-
er it produced efficiencies sufficient to outweigh a particular
venture's anticompetitive potential. HMOs, for example, rote-
810 (1993); Grady, supra note 95, at 767; Felsenthal, supra note 22, at B1, B5. The
American Hospital Association has stated that the absence of clear guidance under
the antitrust laws is a deterrent to the formation of health care joint ventures that
would reduce costs for purchasers of health care services. See The Structure of the
Hospital Industry in the 21st Century: Heanngs Before the Joint Economic Comm.,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 237-39 (1992) (Statement of D. Kirk Oglesby, Jr., Chairman,
Board of Trustees, American Hospital Assoc.); Clinton Presidency, Democratic Con-
gress May Be Recipe for Antitrust Legislation, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1598, at 42 (Jan. 21, 1993). The Federal Health Care Guidelines have somewhat
clarified the antitrust risks for joint ventures among health care providers, but their
reliance on a rule of reason approach for many types of joint ventures leaves sub-
stantial questions as to the legality of particular alliances. See Federal Health Care
Guidelines, supra note 204, at S-15.
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grate providers' activities so completely that, like the musical
association at issue in BMI, they .are able to provide an entirely
new product.21' The fixed-fee medical services made possible by
HMOs are of such a benefit to consumers that they clearly out-
weigh any loss of competition among the members of an HMO.
Other less integrated arrangements among health care providers
also may make available new products that benefit consumers,
such as utilization review and preferred provider discounts.212
The net pro-competitive effect will be less obvious for networks
of health care providers that do not produce such new products
but simply enhance providers' efficiency in delivering existing
services. The courts, however, should give significant weight
under the balancing approach to providers' attempts to generate
cost-savings that can be passed along to consumers. Such sav-
ings may result from competing providers' combination of billing,
data processing, purchasing, marketing, or other admnimstrative
functions which they previously had performed separately" 3
211. For a description of the integrated nature of HMOs, see Frances E. Miller,
Vertical Restraints and Powerful Health Insurers: Exclusionary Conduct Masquerading
as Managed Care?, LAW & CONTEMP PROBS., Spring 1988, at 195, 200.
212. Former Assistant Attorney General Paul McGrath has stated that joint ven-
tures among physicians should not be liable under a per se approach if they agree
to make any of the following new services available to health care consumers: dis-
counted fees, utilization review, joint marketing, or joint administration of claims.
See Grady, supra note 95, at 783 & n.71 (quoting J. Paul McGrath, Remarks Before
the 33d Annual American Bar Ass'n Spring Meeting (Mar. 22, 1985)).
213. The FTC's Policy on Physician Agreements to Control Medical Prepayment
Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,982 (1981), was one of the earliest policy statements to ad-
dress "integration" among health care providers. It defined "integration" as the "join-
ing together or coordination of functions (e.g., production, promotion, management,
distribution, financing, debt collection) normally performed separately by discrete
business entities." Id. at 48,988. Former Assistant Attorney General Charles Rule
has indicated that the Department of Justice would permit rather loosely integrated
ventures if their purpose was to provide more efficient health services:
The Department believes that [provider joint ventures] can achieve
substantial competitive benefits through integration that falls far short of
financial participation and sharing of risks. For example, integrative
efficiencies can be realized through an agreement among physicians to
give up some of their freedom in setting the terms of billing and treat-
ment in order to reduce transaction costs and to offer discount fee levels.
Grady, supra note 95, at 783 & n.72 (quoting Charles Rule, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, Remarks to Connecticut Health Lawyers' Ass'n
12-13 (Mar. 11, 1988)).
JOINT VENTURES
IX. CONCLUSION
Since its origin at the end of the mneteenth century, Amen-
can antitrust law has been subject to the tension between the
efficiencies that result from cooperative activity among competi-
tors and the need to preserve a system of free competition. Most
courts have been unable to resolve this conflict because they
continue to view competition and cooperation as antithetical
concepts. During the last decade, however, many American busi-
nesses have come to the realization that cooperation can be an
effective means of promoting their competitiveness. Strategic
alliances for the development and production of new and exist-
ing products are enhancing productivity in several domestic
industries. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have not yet been able to develop a clear and consistent
standard for analyzing such strategic alliances. As a result,
American firms have been needlessly deterred from entering
into additional joint ventures with legitimate efficiency objec-
tives. The new standard for joint venture analysis proposed in
this Article appropriately recognizes the beneficial as well as the
anticompetitive aspects of such arrangements. The proposed
analysis would be easy for the courts to apply and would give
clear guidance to business executives contemplating new stra-
tegic alliances. A careful reading of recent Supreme Court cases
reveals that this new approach can be adopted by the lower
federal courts under existing precedent. By doing so, the courts
would free American businesses to seek new means of cooperat-
ing to enhance their efficiency in the global marketplace.
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